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The Attorney General . . . submits that despite the fact that 
Spycatcher has received worldwide publication and is in fact 
available in this country for anyone who wants to read it, the law 
forbids the press, the media and indeed anyone else from publishing 
or commenting on any part of it .... If such was the law then the 
law would indeed be an ass, for it would seek to deny to our own 
citizens the right to be informed of matters which are freely 
available throughout the rest of the world and would in fact be 
seeking in vain because anyone who really wishes to read 
Spycatcher can lay his hands on a copy in this country.1 
INTRODUCTION 
As a general proposition, the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to suppress protected speech without some legitimate 
purpose. Depending upon the perceived value of the speech and the 
means chosen to suppress it, that purpose may have to represent an 
important? substantial,3 overriding,4 or even compelling5 governmen-
tal interest.6 
In most instances, the First Amendment also requires some demon-
stration that speech suppression will achieve or contribute to achiev-
ing that legitimate state purpose.7 The required "fit" between the 
purpose and the means chosen may be quite precise8 or merely rea-
sonable.9 The required demonstration of this means-end fit may be 
1. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1988). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that the "symbolic 
speech" of tearing up a selective service certificate is not protected under the First Amendment 
because Congress has the authority to raise armies and selective service certificates play a "legit-
imate and substantial" administrative role in that function). 
3. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (explaining that the government must have at least a substantial interest before regu-
lating commercial speech). 
4. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (holding that, 
absent an overriding contrary interest, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public). 
5. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (ruling that a 
compelling governmental interest must exist in order to prevent the press access to criminal sex-
offense trials). 
6. Chief Justice Warren commented on the "imprecision" of such terms in O'Brien. See 391 
U.S. at 377 (noting that the terms "compelling," "substantial," "subordinating," "paramount," 
"cogent," and "strong" are inherently imprecise). 
7. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976) (holding that to justify a 
prior restraint on the press to publicize information related to a murder trial, the government 
must show that alternative measures will not protect the rights of the accused). 
8. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607 (asserting that to deny the right of free 
speech, the government must demonstrate "that the denial is necessitated by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest"). 
9. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) 
(holding that when regulating commercial speech, the fit between the purpose and the means 
chosen to achieve it need only be reasonable). 
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either empiricaP0 or merely logical.11 But, the government may not 
suppress speech by any means that is wholly ineffective, that does not 
serve,12 further,B or directly advance14 the state's purpose. 
Oddly, the courts have never formally held that this effectiveness 
test encompasses effectiveness in actually suppressing the speech in 
question. Although First Amendment opinions in which courts have 
struck down measures which suppress speech have often noted the 
availability of the same speech through other media . or in other 
places,15 the U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly articulated a 
principle that such a finding should be dispositive, or even decisive, in 
determining whether the measures taken are constitutional. 
Consequently, the government has been permitted to take measures 
that suppress speech, by some, but not other, speakers,16 to some, but 
not other, audiencesP Typically, this result has occurred where the 
Court has relegated the speech or the speaker to a lower degree of 
First Amendment protection, as in the case of commercial or broad-
10. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 
2470 (1994) (finding that, when the government defends a regulation as a means to prevent 
anticipated harms, the government must demonstrate that those harms are real). 
11. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,341-42 (1986) (argu-
ing that the government's restrictions on advertising would logically reduce the demand for 
gambling). 
12. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 610 (explaining that the mechanism chosen, a 
statute which prevented the disclosure of sensitive information in a sex-offense case, was not 
effective in serving the governmental purpose of safeguarding the physical and psychological 
well-being of a minor since the press could obtain the desired information through the trial 
transcripts). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding a statute that bans 
the destruction of selective service cards constitutional because it furthers the government's in-
terest in conscripting manpower for military service). 
14. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (stating that in suppressing commercial speech, a court "must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is no more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest") (emphasis added). 
15. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 596 (recognizing that while the statute at issue 
barred the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of minor sex vic-
tims, the statute did not deny the press access to trial transcripts or court personnel). 
16. See infra notes 193-211 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993), where the Court upheld a Federal Communications Commis-
sion regulation as applied to prohibit a North Carolina radio station from broadcasting lottery 
advertisements, while allowing Virginia radio stations to broadcast such advertisements into 
North Carolina, on the ground that the federal government had a substantial interest in support-
ing the anti-gambling policy of nonlottery states as well as not interfering with the policies of 
states which permit lotteries). 
17. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text (discussing Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), in which the Court upheld a statute banning gambling 
advertisements directed to Puerto Rican residents, but not to tourists, on the ground that the 
statute directly advanced Puerto Rico's substantial interest in reducing the demand for casino 
gambling by its residents, thus protecting their health, safety and welfare). 
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cast speech. In the mid-1980s, for example, the Court affirmed a stat-
ute that effectively precluded local newspapers from carrying 
commercial speech that national newspapers and other media were 
free to carry.18 More recently, the Supreme Court allowed the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to prohibit one local radio station 
from carrying commercial speech that many other stations already 
broadcast to the very same audience.19 The Court also refused to bar 
Congress from preventing cable television operators from carrying 
certain speech despite the fact that other sources provided the same 
speech to the same and other audiences.20 Because the Court failed to 
protect otherwise available speech, without regard to the speaker's 
identity or the speech's content, these decisions have squandered judi-
cial and governmental resources, discriminated among speakers and 
audiences, and engendered disrespect for the law. As objectionable as 
these results are today, they will become unconscionable when the 
convergence of print, broadcasting, cable, telephone, and computer-
assisted communications erases current distinctions among media and 
audiences. 
The highest judicial authorities of Great Britain21 and Canada22 re-
cently expressed opinions that significantly curtailed the power of 
their lower courts to suppress speech when that suppression would be 
futile in preventing the speech from reaching the intended audience.23 
New communications technologies and media market realities re-
18. Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 344. 
19. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2707-08. 
20. Thrner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2468-
69 (1994). 
21. See Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1988) (quashing 
injunctions against republication in British newspapers of excerpts from the book, Spycatcher, 
which the United Kingdom banned, but was published widely abroad). 
22. See Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 3 S.C.R. 835 (1994) (vacating a ban on the 
broadcast of the fictional film, The Boys of St. Vincent, during the trial of clergymen accused of 
sexual misconduct similar to that depicted in the film). In a comparable case, a United States 
federal district court refused to enjoin the broadcast of a television miniseries entitled Deadly 
Matrimony, rejecting plaintiff's argument that the broadcast would prejudice the pending appeal 
of his sentence in connection with the murder portrayed in the program. Corbitt v. National 
Broadcasting Co., No. 92C7655, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17894, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1992). 
The Corbitt court found it significant that the press had extensively covered the trial and that a 
book detailing the murder and plaintiff's role in it had been published the previous year. Id. at 
*5. 
23. The Spycatcher Cases addressed, inter alia, the propriety of an injunction banning newspa-
per serialization of Spycatcher, the autobiography of Peter Wright, a former British security ser-
vice officer. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 550. Upon learning that Mr. Wright 
planned to publish his autobiography in Australia, the Attorney General instituted an action in 
New South Wales against him and his publishers to enjoin publication pursuant to the Official 
Secrets Act 1911. Id. at 552. While that litigation was pending, the government obtained inter-
locutory orders against two other newspapers, the Observer and the Guardian, which had pub-
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ceived some of the credit, or blame, for the outcome of these cases,24 
as did the pervasiveness of the American free speech and free press 
regime.25 It would be perverse indeed if our First Amendment juris-
lished articles in June 1986 on the impending trial, including an outline of some of the author's 
claims in his unpublished manuscript. /d. at 553. 
The injunctions banned disclosure or publication of any information obtained by Mr. Wright 
in his position as a member of the British secret service. /d. The Sunday Times purchased the 
serialization rights and published the first excerpt of the proposed book on July 12, 1987. /d. at 
554-55. The Attorney General then secured an interlocutory injunction in England preventing 
The Sunday Times from publishing further portions of the book while the trial was pending. /d. 
at 555. On July 13, the book was published in the United States. /d. Thereafter, the book was 
published in several other countries and disseminated worldwide; the British government made 
no attempt to prevent its importation into the United Kingdom. /d. at 557-58. The Attorney 
General subsequently sought permanent injunctions against the three newspapers to restrain 
publication of any secret information obtained by the author, order an accounting of the profits 
made by The Sunday Times as a result of the serialization, and obtain a general injunction ban-
ning future publication of information gained by members of the secret service. /d. at 546, 556. 
The Chancery Division trial judge discharged the interlocutory injunctions, holding that the 
Attorney General was not entitled to injunctions against the Guardian and the Observer because 
the book had been published overseas, and thus the damage the injunctions sought to prevent 
had already been realized. /d. at 555. The trial judge further ruled that The Sunday Times had 
breached its duty of confidence by publishing the first excerpt and was, therefore, accountable 
for the profits of the serialization. /d. Finally, the court denied the injunction restraining future 
publication. Id. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that publication of 
Spycatcher in the United States and elsewhere destroyed the secrecy of the contents. /d. Balanc-
ing the public's right to receive information against the Crown's interest in national security, the 
Court of Appeal further held that, because copies of the book were readily available to anyone 
who wished to obtain them, continuing the injunctions was unnecessary and should be dis-
charged. /d. The court decided, however, that the injunctions should remain in force pending 
appeal to the House of Lords. /d. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. /d. See Philomena 
M. Dane, Comment, The Spycatcher Cases, 50 OHio ST. L.J. 405 (1989) (discussing the Spy-
catcher cases and the courts' refusals to grant the government a permanent injunction). 
24. In Dagenais, for example, Chief Justice Lamer noted that 
recent technological advances have brought with them considerable difficulties for 
those who seek to enforce [publication] bans. The efficacy of bans has been reduced by 
the growth of interprovincial and international television and radio broadcasts avail-
able through cable television, satellite dishes, and short-wave radios. It has also been 
reduced by the advent of information exchanges available through computer networks. 
In this global electronic age, meaningfully restricting the ftow of information is becom-
ing increasingly difficult. Therefore, the actual effect of bans on jury impartiality is 
substantially diminishing. 
3 S.C.R. at 886. 
25. In the Court of Appeal's Spycatcher opinions, Lord Justice Bingham argued that the inter-
course between England and the United States is 
so close and so constant that ... it can[not] be [legally] necessary to restrain here the 
publication of information which relates to this country and is circulating freely in the 
United States. As Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C put it: "The truth of the matter 
is that in the contemporary world of electronics and jumbo jets news anywhere is news 
everywhere." 
Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 637 (citations omitted). 
Also of interest is Sir Robert Armstrong's testimony for the government in the Spycatcher trial 
to the effect that the First Amendment precludes the United States' Central Intelligence Agency 
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prudence failed to keep pace with the enlightened approach of our 
common law brethren.26 
This Article argues for a simple proposition: the First Amendment 
imposes a presumption against the suppression of speech when sup-
pression would be futile. Suppression is futile when the speech is 
available to the same audience through some other medium or at 
some other place. The government can overcome this presumption of 
futility only when it asserts an important interest that is unrelated to 
the content of the speech in question, only when the suppression di-
rectly advances that interest. 
In Part I, this Article explores the role that this unarticulated "futil-
ity principle" has played in Supreme Court and other decisions con-
cerning the suppression of core political speech by prior restraint, 
denial of access, and subsequent punishment. In addition, Part I dem-
onstrates how that principle has often, though not always, been disre-
garded by the Court in cases involving the regulatory suppression of 
from imposing an absolute bar on publication by ex-CIA officers and that therefore the govern-
ment has resoned to requiring the author to submit his manuscript to the CIA for vetting before 
publishing it. Id. at 579. 
/d. 
Sir Robert was asked why a similar practice should not be adopted in this country. His 
answer was that the vetted work, as published in the United States, would nevertheless 
be likely to contain information about the CIA that the CIA would prefer was not 
made public. But the CIA had to put up with the First Amendment as (although not as 
Sir Raben put it) a necessary evil. 
26. Particularly apt is the statement of Lord Oliver of Aylmerton the first time the Spycatcher 
case reached the House of Lords: 
We do not have a First Amendment but, as Blackstone observed, the liberty of the 
press is essential to the nature of a free state. The price that we pay is that liberty may 
be and sometimes is harnessed to the carriage of liars or charlatans, but that cannot be 
avoided if the liberty is to be preserved. No one contends that the liberty is absolute 
and there are occasions when it must yield to national emergency, to considerations of 
national security, and, on occasion, to private law rights of confidentiality where they 
are not overborne by some countervailing public interest. I do not for a moment dis-
pute that there are occasions when the strength of the public interest in the preserva-
tion of confidentiality outweighs even the importance of the free exercise of the 
essential privileges which lie at the roots of our society. But if those privileges are to be 
overborne, then they must be overborne to some purpose .... 
Once information has travelled into the public domain by whatever means and is the 
subject matter of public discussion in the press and other public media abroad ... I find 
it unacceptable that publication and discussion in the press in this country should be 
further restrained .... 
Ideas, however unpopular or unpalatable, once released and however released into 
open air of free discussion and circulation, cannot forever be effectively proscribed as if 
they were a virulent disease. "Facilis descensus Averno": and to attempt, even tempo-
rarily, to create a sort of judicial cordon sanitaire against the infection from abroad of 
public comment and discussion is not only, as I believe, certain to be ineffective but 
involves taking the first steps upon a very perilous path. 
Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1320-21 (H.L. 1987). 
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commercial speech. In Part II, this Article more fully articulates the 
rule developed by the case law and justifies its wider application by 
reference to the values it supports. Finally, in Part III, this Article 
applies the rule to actual situations involving computer-assisted com-
munications technology, an integral part of the convergent communi-
cations environment that will soon be upon us. 
I. THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE REVEALED 
A. Classic Prior Restraint Cases 
The ancient maxim that neither law nor equity will act in vain27 has 
often found expression in First Amendment jurisprudence when par-
ties seek injunctions to prohibit publication of publicly available 
speech. The futility of enjoining publication of the history of U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam, details of a grisly rape and mass murder, and 
instructions for making a hydrogen bomb played a certain if unquan-
tifiable role in New York Times v. United States,Z8 Nebraska Press 
Ass'n v. Stuart,Z9 and United States v. Progressive, Inc.,3o respectively. 
In New York Times, the Supreme Court concluded in a brief opin-
ion that the federal government failed to overcome the "heavy pre-
sumption" against the constitutional validity of suppressing speech.31 
The New York Times Court refused to enjoin continued publication of 
a classified history of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam 
War that came to be known as the "Pentagon Papers."32 A govern-
ment contractor had taken the classified materials without authoriza-
tion and given them to the New York Times, The Washington Post, and 
The Boston Globe.33 The government learned of the theft only after 
the Times published extensive excerpts, and it immediately sought to 
block any further publication.34 
27. See HERBERT BROOM, A SELECfiON OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED & ILLUSTRATED 174 
(lOth ed. 1939) ("The Jaw will not itself attempt to do an act which would be vain, ... nor to 
enforce one which would be frivolous."); G. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EOUITY 183, 243 
(1965} (discussing that, because a disgruntled partner could simply terminate the partnership, 
courts generally deny such partner's request for specific performance of partnership matters in a 
partnership-at-wiii based on this maxim). 
28. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
29. 427 u.s. 539 (1976). 
30. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). 
31. 403 U.S. at 714. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. For a detailed description of the facts of New York Times v. United States see SANFORD 
UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS (1973). 
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Of the nine separate opinions written in the case, three specifically 
addressed the futility question.35 Justice Douglas's concurring opin-
ion, which otherwise focused on the impropriety of the government's 
imposition of a prior restraint in the absence of authorizing legislation, 
alluded to the futility of an injunction in minimizing the damaging im-
pact of disclosure: 
There are numerous sets of this material in existence and they ap-
parently are not under any controlled custody. Moreover, the Presi-
dent has sent a set to the Congress. We start then with a case where 
there already is rather wide distribution of the material that is des-
tined for publicity, not secrecy.36 
Justice White similarly recognized the futility of injunctive relief in 
this case, although he would have opened the door widely for criminal 
sanctions in the same circumstances: 
Normally, publication will occur and the damage be done before the 
Government has either opportunity or grounds for suppression. So 
here, publication has already begun and a substantial part of the 
threatened damage has already occurred. The fact of a massive 
breakdown in security is known, access to the documents by many 
unauthorized people is undeniable, and the efficacy of equitable re-
lief against these or other newspapers to avert anticipated damage is 
doubtful at best.37 
Even in dissent, Justice Harlan considered the futility of an injunc-
tion one of the open factual issues to be addressed before the Court 
could rule on the merits: 
[w]hether the threatened harm to the national security or the Gov-
ernment's possessory interest in the documents justifies the issuance 
of an injunction against publication in light of ... [t]he extent to 
which the materials at issue have apparently already been otherwise 
disseminated.38 
Therefore, in a case where no more than three justices subscribed to 
any one of the nine separate opinions, seven agreed that the public 
availability of the material might influence the case's outcome.39 
The Court more fully developed this futility principle in Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, where it considered effectiveness as one of 
three dispositive factors in deciding whether to enjoin publication. In 
35. The three opinions that addressed the futility question were written by Justice Douglas, 
Justice White, and Justice Harlan. !d. 
36. !d. at 722 n.3 (Douglas and Black, J.J., concurring). 
37. ld. at 733 (White and Stewart, J.J., concurring). 
38. !d. at 754-55 (Harlan, Blackmun, J.J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
39. The seven Justices who considered the public availability of the Pentagon Papers in decid-
ing whether to grant injunctive relief in New York Times included Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Douglas, Black, White, Stewart, Harlan, and Blackmun. 
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Nebraska Press, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a gag or-
der that restricted the press's ability to report information related to a 
multiple murder prosecution.40 The gag order incorporated certain 
provisions of otherwise voluntary bar-press guidelines for crime re-
porting.41 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger adopted Judge 
Learned Hand's classic formula from United States v. Dennis:42 
whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, jus-
tifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger."43 To determine whether the gag order met this test, Justice 
Burger found it necessary to evaluate (a) the nature and extent of pre-
trial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to 
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity; and (c) how ef-
fectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened 
danger.44 
Justice Brennan's lengthy concurrence, which argued that gag or-
ders affecting the press are always unconstitutional, also discussed the 
order's futility: 
[m]uch of the information that the Nebraska courts enjoined peti-
tioners from publishing was already in the public domain, having 
been revealed in open court proceedings or through public docu-
ments. Our prior cases have foreclosed any serious contention that 
further disclosure of such information can be suppressed before 
publication or even punished after publication.45 
40. 427 u.s. 539, 542-43 (1976). 
41. /d. at 613-617. 
42. 183 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
43. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212). 
For a critique of the Court's use of Judge Hand's formula in this context see James L. Oakes, The 
Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497, 510-511 (1982) 
(arguing that it is inappropriate to apply Judge Hand's formula in freedom of speech cases where 
the suppressed information is freely available from other sources). 
44. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562. With respect to the third factor, Justice Burger 
wrote: 
Finally, we note that the events disclosed by the record took place in a community of 
850 people. It is reasonable to assume that, without any news accounts being printed or 
broadcast, rumors would travel swiftly by word of mouth. One can only speculate on 
the accuracy of such reports, given the generative propensities of rumors; they could 
well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts. But plainly a whole 
community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life 
within it. 
/d. at 567. 
45. /d. at 595-96 (Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, J.J., concurring). Since Nebraska Press, 
lower courts have consistently refused to enjoin publication of information which was revealed, 
even inadvertently, in open court. See, e.g., In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 
1990) (vacating a district judge's injunction against publishing the name of an attorney targeted 
in a grand jury investigation, which was accidentally disclosed by the district judge in open 
court), cited with approval in In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (authorizing publi-
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Both Justices Burger and Brennan noted that the gag order only 
applied to the local press; therefore the national media remained free 
to publish the same information.46 Justice Brennan remarked that 
Judge Stuart's proposed restraints applied only to the local press 
groups involved the case, who subjected themselves to the court's ju-
risdiction, while other local media organizations remained free to dis-
seminate the information.47 Finally, Justice Brennan argued that even 
if the government could bring every press association into the case 
through collateral restraint proceedings, such efforts "would often be 
ineffective, since disclosure of incriminating material may transpire 
before an effective restraint could be imposed."48 
As Justice Brennan predicted, this very issue arose United States v. 
Progressive, Inc. 49 In Progressive, Inc., the federal government asked 
a federal district court to enjoin The Progressive magazine from pub-
lishing an article which purported to explain how to make a hydrogen 
bomb.50 Announcing the article in advance, The Progressive claimed 
that the author had only used information already in the public do-
main.51 In response, the government argued that much of the infor-
mation was in fact not publicly available.52 Moreover, the 
government asserted, the compilation was classified under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954.53 The trial judge granted a temporary restraining 
cation of the investigative report of a federal independent counsel where the information, 
although held to be governed by grand jury secrecy requirements, was already widely known). 
46. Justice Burger maintained that the Court must not 
ignore the reality of the problems of managing and enforcing pre-trial restraining or-
ders. The territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court is limited by concepts of sover-
eignty. The need for in personam jurisdiction also presents an obstacle to a restraining 
order that applies to publication at large as distinguished from restraining publication 
within a given jurisdiction. 
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 565-566 (citations omitted). 
47. !d. at 609 n.36. 
48. !d. at 609. 
49. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). 
50. /d. at 991. 
51. /d. at 993. Much of the information in the article came from Dr. Edward Teller's Encyclo-
pedia Americana article on the hydrogen bomb. Edward Teller, Hydrogen Bomb, in 14 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA AMERICANA 654 (1978), noted in James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint 
Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497,510-511 (1982). See also Erwin Knoll, The 
H-Bomb and the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 705,706 (1994) (explaining 
that while information concerning the H-Bomb was publicly available, only a major world power 
would possess enough money and other resources to actually create one). 
52. United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 993. 
53. /d. The government argued that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274(b) & 
2280 (1988), "authorize[s] injunctive relief against one who would disclose restricted data 'with 
reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage 
to any foreign nation.'" Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 993 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b) 
(1988)). 
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order against The Progressive, partially because he believed the article 
contained "concepts" vital to the operation of the hydrogen bomb 
that were not accessible in the "public realm."54 The judge also ad-
mitted that the basis for his decision to infringe on the magazine's 
"cherished First Amendment rights" included his fear that a mistake 
in ruling against the government could pave the way for thermonu-
clear annihilation: "In that event, our right to life is extinguished and 
the right to publish becomes moot."ss 
In the end, it was the government's claim that became moot, and 
not the magazine's right to publish, as the government voluntarily 
withdrew its case when two other newspapers published the technical 
essence of The Progressive article while the case was pending appeal.s6 
If the details of the The Progressive's article had ever been secret, as 
the government claimed, they were certainly in the public domain af-
ter the newspaper's actions. Thus, the government ultimately ac-
cepted the futility of continuing the litigation. 
These three classic prior restraint cases show that the notion of futil-
ity already plays some role in First Amendment jurisprudence. A ma-
jority of the New York Times justices recognized the futility of 
suppressing publicly available information. The Nebraska Press Court 
incorporated the doctrine into its three-part test for reviewing the 
constitutionality of injunctive relief. Finally, the futility principle dic-
tated the outcome of The Progressive case although government pros-
ecutors, rather than a court, gave it effect. 
The lower federal courts have also employed the futility concept to 
resolve First Amendment issues. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
for example, implicitly applied the futility principle in In re Providence 
Journa/57 to find a temporary restraining order "transparently inva-
lid."58 In that case, the district court had temporarily restrained the 
Journal from publishing logs of the FBI's electronic surveillance of the 
late mob leader Raymond Patriarca.59 The court reasoned that the 
FBI had improperly released the logs in response to the Journal's re-
54. /d. 
55. Id. at 996. 
56. RALPH L. HOLSINGER, MEDIA LAW 48-50 (1994). The two newspapers that published the 
infonnation were the Madison Press Connection, which printed a letter that contained most of 
the technical infonnation contained in the The Progressive's article, and The Wall Street Journal, 
which ran an article on "nuclear matters." ld. 
57. 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g en bane, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
dismissed, United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988). 
58. Id. at 1352-53. 
59. /d. at 1345. 
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quest under the Freedom of Information Act.6o The Journal, how-
ever, violated the order the next day by publishing an article based on 
the logs and calling the order "a prior restraint in violation of the Con-
stitution. "61 As a result, the paper and its Executive Editor were con-
victed of criminal contempt.62 In holding that the collateral bar rule63 
did not apply where a court order was "transparently" unconstitu-
tional, the First Circuit indicated that the availability of the informa-
tion to other media significantly contributed to its holding.64 
Other cases also illustrate how the lower federal courts have ap-
plied the futility principle to deny injunctive relief for invasion of pri-
vacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For 
example, in Jones v. Turner,65 a federal district court declined to en-
join distribution of an issue of Penthouse magazine containing semi-
nude photographs of a woman who claimed that she had been sexually 
harassed by then-Governor Bill Clinton.66 Beyond the fact that it 
found Ms. Jones unlikely to prevail on the merits of an invasion of 
privacy suit under New York law,67 the court determined that injunc-
tive relief would likely prove ineffective because the magazine had 
already been widely disseminated to distributors and subscribers.68 
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344-45. 
61. In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344-45. 
62. /d. 
63. The collateral bar rule provides that a party may not violate a court order and then raise 
the issue of its unconstitutionality as a defense in any resulting criminal contempt proceeding. 
/d. at 1346. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First 
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53, 94 (1984) (comparing collateral bar rule violations with 
certain statutory violations). See generally Richard E. Labunski, A First Amendment Exception 
to the "Collateral Bar" Rule: Protecting Freedom of Expression and the Legitimacy of Courts, 22 
PEPP. L. REv. 405 (1995) (discussing the collateral bar rule and analyzing its impact on First 
Amendment rights). 
64. In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344-45. The court stated that: 
[a] party seeking a prior restraint against the press must show ... that the prior re-
straint will be effective . . . . [H]ad the court considered the likely efficacy of the order 
it would have concluded that the order would not necessarily protect Patriarca's rights. 
Other media ... had the same information that the government had disclosed to the 
Journal. Moreover, Patriarca's complaint specifically alleged that portions of the infor-
mation disclosed by the FBI had already been "disseminated" by the media. It is there-
fore hard to imagine a finding that the prior restraint would accomplish its purpose. 
/d. at 1351. 
65. No. 94 Civ. 8603, 1995 WL 106111 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1995). 
66. /d. at *1. 
67. /d. at *20-21. 
68. The court explained that: 
Penthouse has already shipped hundreds of thousands of copies of the article in its 
magazines to its subscribers and distributors. Moreover, there also already has been a 
great deal of news coverage of the photographs and article, and several of the pictures 
have been displayed both on television and in the print media. 
/d. at *21. 
1995] THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE 13 
In other cases, courts have denied injunctive relief because the pub-
lic character of the underlying acts precluded the plaintiff from estab-
lishing an element of the tort.69 Before further discussing the impact 
of the futility principle on civil tort actions, this Article first examines 
the role of the futility principle in a line of cases that challenged media 
access to judicial records and proceedings.7o 
B. Denying Access to Public Information 
This discussion focuses primarily on the courts' authority to deny 
the electronic media access to aural and visual evidence offered in 
open court and thus readily available to both the print media and 
members of the general public who are in the courtroom. Although 
the Supreme Court has not found a constitutional requirement that 
such information be made available,71 it has recogniZed a common law 
right to inspect and copy public documents, including examination of 
judicial records.72 This Section also examines two cases in which the 
futility principle was instrumental in giving the press access to the 
courtroom and to confidential police materials, respectively: Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia73 and Globe Newspapers v. Police Com-
missioner of Boston.74 
According to defense counsel, Penthouse had already mailed all subscription copies of the 
magazine and shipped most of the newsstand copies to wholesalers and retailers. /d. at *4. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued in vain that injunctive relief was appropriate if any of the potential 
damage could be prevented: 
Now, if in fact two million or so copies have been distributed, that's not to say they 
cannot be returned. That's not to say they can't be brought back into Penthouse's 
control. As far as we are aware, they have not hit the newsstands. With respect to the 
issue of would the relief be effective, if a defendant has the opportunity to inflict harm 
to a plaintiff on a given number of times, and those are already out in the open, in this 
case two million times, two million plus times, but they have the ability to inflict even 
greater harm on the plaintiff, there is no reason why they should be entitled to inflict 
additional harm in whatever number of additional copies that may be to be distributed 
in the future. 
/d. at *3. 
69. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 827 (Ala. 1994) (refusing to enjoin distribution of a 
novel based on an actual murder). The Doe court reasoned that the murder was a "matter ... of 
legitimate public concern." !d. Consequently, the plaintiff could not establish an essential ele-
ment of invasion of privacy: that the defendant "wrongfully intrud[ed) into private activities in a 
manner that would outrage, or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to, a person of 
reasonable sensibilities." /d. at 827-28. 
70. This Article revisits the relationship between the futility principle and civil tort actions 
when it examines the constitutional privacy cases in part I.C, infra. 
71. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532, 589 (1965). 
72. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597. 
73. 448 u.s. 555 (1980). 
74. 648 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. 1985). 
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The problems created by the presence of audio-visual technology in 
the courtroom should not surprise anyone who has viewed films of the 
Lindbergh baby kidnapping trial,75 read the Supreme Court's opinions 
in Estes v. Texas76 or Sheppard v. Maxwell, 77 or watched any of the 
O.J. Simpson trial on television.78 In addition, the U.S. Judicial Con-
ference recently decided to terminate a three-year experiment which 
allowed the media to broadcast civil proceedings in some federal 
courts, despite the paucity of judicial complaints.79 In the cases that 
follow, however, few of the courts' traditional concerns (e.g., prejudi-
cial effect on the jury, disruption of the trial process, grandstanding by 
parties and witnesses) were present. These cases did not present the 
question of whether denying broadcast journalists covering the trial 
the use of their electronic equipment violated the First Amendment; 
the tapes at issue had been submitted as evidence in open court and 
thus were public records. Instead, the issue typically involved the de-
fendant's privacy interest in minimizing the dissemination of embar-
rassing information versus the broadcast media's interest in 
"actuality" (i.e., the "live" aural and visual information that print me-
dia cannot convey to their audience). 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,80 the Supreme Court 
considered whether the First Amendment entitled broadcasters and 
the general public to hear White House conversations that had been 
secretly recorded by President Nixon.81 The government had intro-
duced the tapes as evidence in the trial of former Attorney General 
John Mitchell and other Watergate figures.82 Jurors, reporters, and 
75. See generally L. KENNEDY, THE AIRMAN AND THE CARPENTER: THE LINDBERGH KID-
NAPPING AND THE FRAMING OF RICHARD HAUPTMANN (1985) (describing the kidnapping of the 
Lindbergh baby and the resulting trial of Richard Hauptmann); A. ScADUTO, SCAPEGOAT. THE 
LoNESOME DEATH OF BRUNO RICHARD HAUPTMANN (1976) (examining the facts SUrrOunding 
the Hauptmann trial under the premise that Hauptmann was innocent); GEORGE WALLER, KID-
NAP: THE STORY OF THE LINDBERGH CASE (1961) (providing a narrative of the Hauptmann 
trial); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 124-25 (1987) (describing the Hauptmann trial as "an atmosphere of 
near-hysteria"); Robert R. Bryan, The Execution of the Innocent: The Tragedy of the 
Hauptmann-Lindbergh and Bigelow Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 831 (1990-91) 
(discussing the mass hysteria surrounding the trial of Hauptmann and Bigelow). 
76. 381 u.s. 532 (1965). 
77. 384 u.s. 333 (1966). 
78. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (L.A. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
79. See Henry J. Reske, No More Cameras in Federal Courts: Judicial Conference Ends Ex-
periment Despite Few Complaints from Judges, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 28 (reporting the major-
ity's view that "even if a few participants were affected by broadcast proceedings, a fair trial 
could be threatened"). 
80. 435 u.s. 589 (1965). 
81. /d. at 591. 
82. Id. at 594. 
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members of the public who sat in the courtroom had already heard 
the tapes83 and transcripts had been widely distributed. 84 District 
Judge Gerhard Gesell initially heard the motion and found the me-
dia's First Amendment claim to the tapes "wholly without merit."ss 
Judge Gesell based his decision on the Supreme Court's oft-repeated 
maxim that the First Amendment guarantees the press no greater 
right of access than that afforded the general public.86 Judge Gesell 
did find, however, that the public enjoys a privilege, based on com-
mon law and tradition, to "inspect and obtain copies of such judicial 
records."87 Judge Gesell concluded that the White House tapes con-
stituted just such records, notwithstanding President Nixon's objec-
tions to their release.ss Before Judge Gesell could find an acceptable 
mechanism for releasing the tapes, however, the Mitchell trial con-
cluded and the matter was returned to trial judge John Sirica.89 Con-
cerned about the possibility that the tapes might prejudice the appeals 
of the four men convicted in that trial, Judge Sirica denied the media's 
83. /d. 
84. /d. 
85. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. D.C. 1974). 
86. /d. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)). Judge 
Gesell also quoted a well-known paragraph from Justice Stewart's 1974 address at Yale Law 
School, entitled "Or of the Press": 
"So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, and 
may seek to learn what it can. But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to 
do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot expect 
from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitutional 
right to have access to particular government information or to require openness from 
the bureaucracy . . . . The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its 
resolution." 
Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. at 641 (quoting Supreme Court Justice Stewart, Address at the Yale Law 
School Sequincentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974)). 
87. /d. (citing Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404 (1894)). The Drawbaugh court asserted 
that "any attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the records of the court, would seem to be inconsis-
tent with the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to which all 
persons have the right of access and to its records, according to long-established usage and prac-
tice." /d. (quoting Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. at 407). 
88. Judge Gessel explained that 
[a]lthough former President Nixon has been pardoned, ... he has no right to prevent 
normal access to these public documents which have already been released in full text 
. . . . His words cannot be retrieved; they are public property . . . . [T]he fact the evi-
dence is in aural form is of no special consequence. The tape exhibits are in evidence 
and have therefore come into the public domain and the public should have the opportu-
nity to hear them. Whether any individual affected has a right under the law of privacy 
or related doctrines against anyone who thereafter republishes is not to be determined 
here. 
!d. at 642 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
89. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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petitions for immediate release of the tapes,90 only to be reversed by 
the Court of Appeals.91 Although the Court of Appeals, like Judge 
Gesell, ruled on common law grounds, its language more closely re-
sembled constitutional, as opposed to common law, jurisprudence.92 
Writing for the court, Chief Judge David Bazelon insisted that the 
court had "no need, and therefore ... no occasion, to decide the novel 
constitutional question" raised by a ban on inspecting or copying the 
tapes.93 
In reversing Chief Judge Bazelon's decision to release the tapes, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the common law right of access to judi-
cial proceeding described by the trial and appellate courts.94 But, the 
Court found no reason to "delineate precisely the contours" of that 
right because it assumed, arguendo, that the common law right of ac-
cess applied to the tapes.95 The Court also assigned an unspecified 
amount of weight to the fact that the public already had access to the 
taped conversations through the trial and release of printed tran-
90. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186 (1975). 
91. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1264-65. 
92. /d. The Court of Appeals stated that 
[t]his common law right is not some arcane relic of ancient English law. To the con-
trary, the right is fundamental to a democratic state. As James Madison warned, "A 
popular Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both .... A people who mean to be their 
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Like 
the First Amendment, then, the right of inspection serves to produce "an informed and 
enlightened public opinion." Like the public trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, 
the right serves to "safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments 
of persecution," to promote the search for truth, and to assure "confidence in ... judi-
cial remedies." And in the instant case, like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
right of inspection serves to promote equality by providing those who were and those 
who were not able to gain entry to Judge Sirica's cramped courtroom the same oppor-
tunity to hear the White House tapes. 
/d. at 1258 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also Donna R. Moliere, Comment, The 
Common Law Right of Public Access When Audio and Video Tape Evidence in a Court Record is 
Sought for Purposes of Copying and Dissemination to the Public, 28 LoY. L. REv. 163, 204 (1982) 
(stating that "[t]he press' freedom to report accurately on judicial proceedings is also a highly 
valued first amendment right. This freedom is of critical importance in a democratic government 
in which the proper functioning of the judiciary is an important public concern") (footnotes 
omitted). 
93. See Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1259 ("We refer to these constitutional provisions simply to un-
derscore the importance of the values that the common law right seeks to protect, and to make 
clear our duty to tread carefully in this important area."). Later in the opinion, Chief Judge 
Bazelon reiterated that the interests served by the common law right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings "are closely related to" First Amendment interests. /d. at 1261 n.39. 
94. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
95. /d. at 599. 
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scripts.96 The Court predicated its reversal on statutory grounds, 
namely the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,97 
which the Court found controlling.98 Although the Court declined to 
consider how it would have decided the case absent that statute,99 it 
expressly rejected constitutional arguments based on the First and 
Sixth Amendments.100 Still, the Court acknowledged that any mem-
ber of the public present in Judge Sirica's courtroom could hear the 
tapes, and offered no principled explanation for limiting that right to 
members of the public with the right courthouse connections or the 
time to wait in line for a seat.lOl 
In a more recent controversy involving recorded material, three 
courts of appeal granted the public access to videotapes of the so-
called ABSCAM sting operations in the early 1980s, viewing the press 
merely as a conduit through which the public could exercise its ac-
knowledged right to the information.102 In each of these cases, video 
tapes of members of Congress and others apparently accepting bribes 
from wealthy Middle Eastern businessmen were introduced into evi-
dence in open court by federal prosecutors.103 Court officials distrib-
uted transcripts to the jury and the media and permitted artists to 
create sketches from the videotapes.104 In Myers, District Judge 
George Pratt granted the application of the three major television net-
works to copy and televise the videotapes, and the Second Circuit af-
firmed his decision. The Second Circuit reasoned that: 
[ o ]nee the evidence has become known to the members of the pub-
lic, including representatives of the press, through their attendance 
at a public session of court, it would take the most extraordinary 
96. See id. at 599 n.ll ("We need not decide whether such facts ever could be decisive. In 
view of our disposition of this case, the fact that substantial access already has been accorded the 
press and the public is simply one factor to be weighed."). 
97. 44 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
98. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act di-
rects the Administrator of General Services to take custody of presidential tapes, which govern-
ment archivists then screen for portions of historical value to be preserved for use in judicial 
proceedings and eventual public release. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
99. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603. 
100. /d. at 609-610. 
101. /d. at 609. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 
44 STAN. L. REv. 927, 942-43 (1992) (distinguishing the right of access accorded to the press 
from that enjoyed by the general public). 
102. National Broadcasting Co. v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980). Contra 
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant's right 
to a fair trial outweighed the media's common law right of access to incriminating tapes intro-
duced at an earlier trial of three co-defendants, who were acquitted). 
103. Myers, 635 F.2d at 948; Criden, 648 F.2d at 816; Jenrette, 638 F.2d at 611. 
104. Myers, 635 F.2d at 948; Criden, 648 F.2d at 816; Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 611. 
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circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not 
physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evi-
dence, when it is in a form that readily permits sight and sound 
reproduction.1os 
In Criden, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's denial of the media's application for permission to copy the 
ABSCAM tapes implicating Philadelphia attorney Howard Criden. 
The court ~xplained that: 
[w]hatever the validity of the original ruling [on admissibility at 
trial], the tapes were in fact admitted into evidence, their contents 
publicized, and the transcripts of the tapes released to the press. 
Thus, whatever privacy right defendants may have claimed in such 
tapes is irretrievably lost, and if any remedy remains, it must per-
force be confined to appellate action with regard to the underlying 
conviction. It would unduly narrow the right of access were it to be 
confined to evidence properly admitted, since the right is based on 
the public's interest in seeing and knowing the events which actually 
transpired.106 
In Jenrette, the D.C. Circuit only had to look back to Judge Bazelon's 
opinion in Mitchell to reverse the district court's denial of media ac-
cess to tapes of Representative John Jenrette's moment of weakness. 
"[T]he tapes had been seen and heard by those members of the press 
and public who attended the trial. Our cases have recognized that 
such previous access is a factor which lends support to subsequent 
access. "107 · 
The Supreme Court itself added significance to the prior availability 
of information in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,108 when it 
struck down a Massachusetts statute that denied the public access to 
the courtroom during the testimony of minor sexual assault victims, 109 
notwithstanding that the court had released transcripts of the minor's 
105. 635 F.2d at 952. 
106. 648 F.2d at 828. 
107. Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 614. Even the Fifth Circuit, which ruled against media access in a 
similar but distinguishable case, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, conceded that prior availabil-
ity is a factor which must be considered in such cases: 
While the provision to media representatives of verbatim transcripts of the recordings 
and preferential seating at the trial, as afforded in the court below, certainly does not 
conclude the matter against a right to further access, it has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court as a factor properly to be considered in the grant or denial of physical 
access. 
654 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981). See Laurie Romanowich, Recent Case Analysis, Belo Broad-
casting Corp. v. Clark: No Access to Taped Evidence, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 257, 275-76 (1982) 
(arguing that the Belo Broadcasting court gave "inadequate weight to the presumption in favor 
of access"). 
108. 457 u.s. 596 (1982). 
109. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981). 
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testimony to the media.110 Although the Court had previously held in 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia that the public had a First Amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials, 111 it did not rely solely on that 
decision in Globe Newspaper Co.l12 Instead, it called upon the unar-
ticulated futility principle to find that Massachusetts had not asserted 
a compelling interest sufficientto overcome the public's First Amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials guaranteed by Richmond 
Newspapers. 113 
The futility principle also seems to have been decisive in Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Police Commissioner of Boston.114 In that case, re-
porters sought access to materials collected by the Boston Police De-
partment in its investigation of police misconduct in a highly 
publicized and racially volatile murder.115 A U.S. Department of Jus-
tice report and a lengthy response by the Boston police had previously 
disclosed much of the substantive information contained in the confi-
110. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 610-11. 
111. 448 u.s. 555, 581 (1980). 
112. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 596 (striking down a Massachusetts statute which 
denied the press access to the courtroom during minor sexual assault victims' testimony). See 
generally Sally M. Keenan, Comment, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 11 HoFSTRA L. 
REv. 1353 (1983} (analyzing the Globe Newspaper case, focusing on its impact on First Amend-
ment issues and the public's common law right of access). 
113. The Court's reasoning clearly embodied the futility concept: 
Although § 16A bars the press and general public from the courtroom during the testi-
mony of minor sex victims, the press is not denied access to the transcript, court person-
nel, or any other possible source that could provide an account of the minor victim's 
testimony. Thus § 16A cannot prevent the press from publicizing the substance of a 
minor victim's testimony, as well as his or her identity. If the Commonwealth's interest 
in encouraging minor victims to come forward depends on keeping such matters secret, 
§ 16A hardly advances that interest in an effective manner. 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added}. See also In re The Charlotte Observer, 
882 F.2d 850,854-55 (4th Cir. 1989) (reversing the closure of a hearing on defendant's motion for 
change of venue where "all of the publicity whose exposure in this hearing is the subject of 
concern is already in the public domain"); In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(remanding an order to close a pretrial suppression hearing to determine whether "the informa-
tion sought to be kept confidential has already been given sufficient public exposure to preclude 
a closure order on this account"). 
In two other access cases, however, judges all but ignored the futility principle by allowing the 
public to attend evidentiary hearings while denying access to the news media or conditioning 
media access on a nonbinding promise to comply with state bench-bar-press guidelines. For 
example, in Sacramento Bee v. United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth 
Circuit grudgingly conceded that allowing access to the public but not the press was error, but 
found it insufficient to justify issuing a writ of mandamus. /d. at 483. Similarly, in Federated 
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 633 P.2d 74 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 984 (1982), the 
Washington Supreme Court justified its exclusion of the press as a reasonable "experiment" 
falling within the trial court's power to exclude press and public alike. /d. at 78. 
114. 648 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. 1985). 
115. /d. at 423. 
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dential police records sought by the Globe.116 When the police com-
missioner declined to release the actual materials compiled during the 
police investigation, the Globe filed suit.117 
In ordering the release of most of the police records, the trial judge 
"indicated that the considerable amount of previous publicity given to 
much of the information in the [Justice Department] report and the 
[Boston police] response had influenced his decision to order disclo-
sure of materials that might otherwise be protected" under exemp-
tions to state public disclosure laws.118 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's order, pointing out that the 
extensive publicity had compromised any privacy interests that might 
be affected by renewed disclosure, and even warranted release of se-
cret grand jury testimony.119 The court, quoting the trial judge with 
approval, emphasized that "it is impossible to erase from public 
knowledge information already released."120 
The access cases establish that the futility principle, although unac-
knowledged, plays an important role in discouraging the suppression 
of speech by supplementing and reinforcing the more traditional First 
Amendment principle that a "trial is a public event and what tran-
spires in the courtroom is public property."121 Moreover, the futility 
principle apparently prompted one court to release documents that 
would otherwise have been protected from public access by statutory 
exemptions to state disclosure laws.12z 
116. /d. 
117. /d. at 423-24. 
118. /d. at 424. 
119. /d. at 426, 428-29. In deciding to release the police reports, the court quoted In re North, 
16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994), explaining that "[t)here must come a time ... when informa-
tion is sufficiently widely known that it has lost its character as [protected grand jury) material. 
The purpose in [protecting grand jury material) is to preserve secrecy. Information widely 
known is not secret." /d. at 429. 
120. /d. at 426 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 648 N.E.2d 419, 
426 (Mass. 1985)). See also Commercial Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765 
F.2d 823, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1985) (unsealing documents filed in a post-conviction criminal pro-
ceeding where "most of the information the government [sought] to keep confidential con-
cem[ed) matters that might easily be surmised from what [wa]s already in the public record), 
cited with approval in The Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291-292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (un-
sealing plea agreement with potential witness in ongoing criminal investigation where the fact 
and terms of the agreement had already been published in the newspaper). 
121. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609, 614 (1981) (quoting United 
States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
122. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610, n.26 (1982) (noting that 
the state's interest in barring public and press access to criminal sex offense trials during the 
testimony of minor victims does not justify a mandatory closure rule absent a showing that clo-
sure would improve the quality of testimony of all child victims). 
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C. Liability for Invasion of Privacy 
Having considered cases involving prior restraints and denial of ac-
cess, this Article now examines a line of subsequent punishment cases. 
Depending on the nature of the underlying claim, courts generally 
evaluate the constitutionality of measures imposing civil or criminal 
penalties on speech by balancing the free speech interests of the 
speaker (and sometimes the audience) against either the private inter-
ests of the person whom the speech has injured or society's interest in 
order, morality, or other values.123 These public and private interests 
converged in the constitutional privacy cases, where the Supreme 
Court struck down state statutes that provided both civil and criminal 
remedies for disclosure of otherwise public information. 
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 124 the Supreme Court held that 
"States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful infor-
mation contained in official court records open to public inspec-
tion."125 Cox Broadcasting began as a civil lawsuit for damages under 
a Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast 
the name or identity of a rape victim.126 The father of 17-year-old 
Cynthia Cohn had sued Cox Broadcasting Co., which had identified 
her by name in a broadcast about the trial of the six youths charged 
with her rape and murder.127 In granting Cohn's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court rejected Cox Broadcasting's constitutional 
arguments and held that the statute gave a civil remedy to those in-
jured by its violation.12B Although the Georgia Supreme Court found 
that Cohn should have based his cause of action on the common law 
tort of public disclosure and not the statute, the court upheld the stat-
ute's constitutionality as a expression of the public policy of Georgia 
that disclosure of a rape victim's name was not protected expression 
under the First Amendment,129 
The United States Supreme Court declined to address Cox Broad-
casting's argument that the press may not be held civilly or criminally 
liable for publishing truthful statements, however damaging they 
might be.13o Instead, the Court focused on the narrower question of 
123. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (stating that States 
must weigh the interest in privacy against the interests of the public to know and of the press to 
publish). 
124. 420 u.s. 469 (1975). 
125. /d. at 495. 
126. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972). 
127. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 420 U.S. at 474 n.5. 
128. Id. at 474. 
129. /d. at 474-75. 
130. /d. at 490-91. 
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the press's liability for broadcasting such truthful statements which are 
found in public court records. 131 The Court found support for its deci-
sion in the then-proposed version of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, which embodied the futility principle.132 Applying that princi-
ple, the Court found that the First Amendment interest in a vigorous 
press outweighs the "fading" interest in privacy when the information 
already appears on the public record.133 
The Court followed Cox Broadcasting in Oklahoma Publishing Co. 
v. Oklahoma County District Court134 and Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Co., 135 in which the Court further defined the rights of the me-
dia to publish public information. First, in Oklahoma Publishing, the 
Court struck down a pretrial order enjoining reporters who attended a 
juvenile proceeding from publishing the name or photograph of a 
young boy involved in that proceeding.136 Although the mode of sup-
pression constituted a prior restraint, subject to punishment by con-
tempt, the Supreme Court relied on both Nebraska Press and Cox 
Broadcasting, holding that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely dis-
seminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in 
fact open to the public. "137 
Similarly, in Daily Mail Publishing, the Court struck down a West 
Virginia statute which imposed a fine and imprisonment on any news-
paper publishing the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender 
without the prior approval of the juvenile court.138 Reporters had ob-
tained the name of a 14-year-old charged with killing a classmate by 
interviewing eyewitnesses, police, and an assistant prosecuting attor-
ney.D9 A local newspaper, The Charleston Gazette, then published 
the child's name, and at least three different radio stations broadcast 
the information.l40 When the Daily Mail published the juvenile's 
131. /d. 
132. See id. at 493-494 ("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further public-
ity to information about the plaintiff which is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving 
publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life which are matters of public record.") (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 cmt. C (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967)}. 
133. See id. at 495-96 ("If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, 
the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of pri-
vate information."). 
134. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). 
135. 443 u.s. 97 (1979). 
136. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 430 U.S. at 311-12. 
137. /d. at 310. 
138. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. at 98 (quoting W. VA. CoDE § 49-7-3 (1976)). 
139. /d. at 99. 
140. /d. 
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name, however, a Kanawha County grand jury indicted the newspa-
per.141 The state supreme court quashed the indictment on the 
ground that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech and 
that the state's interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile of-
fender did not overcome the heavy presumption against its 
constitutionality.t42 
In affirming the state supreme court's decision, the United States 
Supreme Court brushed aside the state court's doctrinal arguments in 
favor of a futility analysis.143 The Court found that only the "highest 
form of state interest" will sustain the validity of sanctions for publish-
ing truthful information lawfully obtained about a matter of public 
interest, whether the information was provided by the government or 
not. 144 Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the state's 
interest in preserving the anonymity of juvenile offenders was not of 
the "highest order."145 Moreover, the Court stated, even if the state's 
asserted interest had passed constitutional muster, the statute chosen 
to serve that interest did not effectively accomplish its stated 
purpose.146 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist embraced the futility 
argument, even though he rejected the Court's holding that protecting 
the anonymity of a juvenile offender could never constitute an interest 
of the highest order: 
It is difficult to take very seriously West Virginia's asserted need to 
preserve the anonymity of its youthful offenders when it permits 
other, equally, if not more, effective means of mass communication 
to distribut~ this information without fear of punishment.147 
Justice Rehnquist added in a footnote that "an obvious failure of a 
state statute to achieve its purpose is entitled to considerable weight in 
the balancing process that is employed in deciding issues arising under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment protections accorded freedom 
141. !d. at 100. 
142. !d. 
143. !d. at 103-105. 
144. !d. at 103-104. 
145. !d. at 104. 
146. !d. The Court concluded that the statute did not effectively protect juvenile offenders' 
identities because 
[t]he statute does not restrict the electronic media or any form of publication, except 
"newspapers," from printing the names of youths charged in a juvenile proceeding. In 
this very case, three radio stations announced the alleged assailant's name before the 
Daily Mail decided to publish it. 
!d. at 104-05. 
147. !d. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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of expression."148 It would take a decade and a fourth major privacy 
case, Florida Star v. B.J.F.,149 for the Court to synthesize the holdings 
of Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing and Daily Mail Publishing 
and begin to enunciate a true futility principle. 
In Florida Star, the Court struck down a state statute that made it a 
misdemeanor to print, publish or broadcast, in an instrument of mass 
communication, the name of a victim of a sexual offense.tso A Florida 
Star reporter-trainee had copied the full name of a sexual assault vic-
tim from a police report placed in the department's pressroom.1s1 
This information formed the basis for a one-paragraph article which 
appeared in the newspaper.152 The victim filed a civil suit against the 
Florida Star, alleging negligent violation of the statute, and the jury 
awarded her $100,000 in damages.153 At trial, the judge had rejected 
the newspaper's First Amendment arguments and directed a verdict 
for B.J.F.154 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
court's decision and the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary 
review.155 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and analyzed 
the case under Daily Mail, identifying the futility principle as "under-
girding" that decision.156 Thming to the statute at issue, the Court 
found three independent reasons why Florida could not impose liabil-
ity to protect the anonymity of rape victims: 1) the information re-
ported was available in the police pressroom, 2) the negligence per se 
standard employed by the statute was too broad, and 3) the statute 
was facially underinclusive.1S7 All three of the court's reasons impli-
cate the futility principle. 
Initially, if the futility principle has any meaning at all, it surely en-
compasses situations in which the information at issue has been pub-
148. /d. at 105 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
149. 491 u.s. 524 (1989). 
150. !d. at 526 (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.03). 
151. /d. at 527. 
152. /d. 
153. /d. at 528-29. 
154. /d. 
155. /d. at 529. 
156. The Court summarized the development of the futility principle: 
The Daily Mail formulation reflects the fact that it is a limited set of cases indeed 
where, despite the accessibility of the public to certain information, a meaningful public 
interest is served by restricting its further release by other entities, like the press. As 
Daily Mail observed in its summary of Oklahoma Publishing, "once the truthful infor-
mation was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could not constitu-
tionally restrain its dissemination." 
/d. at 535 (citations omitted). 
157. /d. at 538-541. 
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lished as a press release.158 Second, addressing the statute's 
negligence per se standard, the Court said that the statute could not 
be saved absent a requirement of case-by-case determinations of for 
example, "whether the identity of the victim is already known 
throughout the community."159 If this examination is material to the 
constitutionality of the statute, then so too is the futility principle. Fi-
nally, just as it had rejected West Virginia's practice of limiting the 
application of its statute to newspapers in Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing Co., in Florida Star the Court disapproved Florida's limiting the 
application of its statute to an "instrument of mass communica-
tion."160 Noting Florida's admission that the statute would not apply 
to the "backyard gossip who tells 50 people," the Court concluded 
that a "ban on disclosures effected by 'instrument[s] of mass commu-
nication' simply cannot be defended on the ground that partial 
prohibitions may effect partial relief."161 
So important is this third iteration of the futility principle that Jus-
tice Scalia said it formed the entire basis for his vote to strike down 
the Florida statute.162 By its failure to prevent the dissemination of 
the victim's identity among her friends and acquaintances, Justice 
Scalia asserted that the statute "ha[d] every appearance of a prohibi-
tion that society is prepared to impose on the press but not upon 
itself. "163 
In conclusion, the privacy cases, like the access and prior restraint 
cases, put considerable flesh on the bare assertion that core speech 
which has already been made public may not be suppressed. The 
Court, however, has imposed limits on the futility principle. In partic-
ular, the Court has failed to consistently apply the futility principle in 
cases where the speech is relegated to some reduced First Amend-
ment status, thus subjecting it to less vigorously controlled content 
regulation. 
158. See id. at 538-39 ("The government's issuance of such a release, without qualification, can 
only convey to recipients that the government considered dissemination lawful, and indeed ex-
pected the recipients to disseminate the information further."). 
159. /d. at 539. 
160. /d. at 540 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03). 
161. /d. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03). 
162. /d. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
163. /d. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring). In 1994, the Florida Supreme Court adopted similar 
reasoning when it struck down the criminal provisions of the same statute, declining to save it 
from fatal underinclusiveness through extensive rewriting. See State v. Globe Communications 
Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1994) ("[T]he 'broad sweep' and 'underinclusiveness of [the 
statute] are even more troublesome when the statute is used to mandate criminal sanctions."). 
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D. Regulation of Commercial Speech 
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court declared that the First 
Amendment does not protect "commercial speech."164 Justice Rob-
erts offered no authority for that assertion; indeed, there was none to 
offer.165 Today, over one half century later, the Court is still trying to 
explain its commercial speech doctrine.l66 One of the first in a series 
of cases that ultimately restored some measure of protection to com-
mercial speech, Bigelow v. Virginia167 demonstrates the futility of sup-
pressing the publication of information in one state that is readily 
available in other states.168 
In Bigelow, the Court struck down a Virginia statute that made it a 
misdemeanor to encourage abortion by "publication, lecture, adver-
tisement ... or in any other manner."169 Bigelow was convicted of 
running an advertisement promoting abortion services in New York 
City (where abortions were legal) in the newspaper that he edited in 
Virginia (where abortions were illegal).170 Although the Court did 
not hand down its final decision in Bigelow until after it decided Roe 
v. Wade, 171 which constitutionalized abortion rights on the basis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy, it decided Bigelow on First 
Amendment grounds.172 Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court: 
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of 
potential interest and value to a diverse audience - not only to 
164. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (asserting that "the Constitution im-
poses no ... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising"). 
165. As noted by Justice Blackmun in a footnote in Bigelow v. Virginia: 
Mr. Justice Douglas, who was a Member of the Court when Chrestensen was decided 
and who joined that opinion, has observed: "The ruling was casual, almost offhand. 
And it has not survived reflection." Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, 
Marshall, and Powell, has observed: "There is some doubt concerning whether the 
'commercial speech' distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen ... retains con-
tinuing validity." 
421 U.S. 820, 820 n.6. (1975) (citations omitted). 
166. See generally Robert T. Cahill, Jr., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: To-
wards Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Commercial Speech, 28 U. RrcH. L. REv. 225 (1994) 
(discussing the Supreme Court's wavering approach to commercial speech and the impact of the 
case Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993), on the commercial speech 
doctrine). 
167. 421 u.s. 809 (1975). 
168. New York Times v. Sullivan was arguably the first case to seriously weaken the commer-
cial speech doctrine articulated in Valentine v. Chrestensen by holding that First Amendment 
protected core political speech even if it appeared in the guise of a paid advertisement. 376 U.S. 
254, 266 (1964). 
169. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13 (quoting VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)). 
170. /d. at 811-13. 
171. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
172. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 829. 
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readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those 
with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject 
matter or the law of another State and its development, and to read-
ers seeking reform in Virginia.173 
27 
The Court noted that Virginia could neither regulate the advertise-
ment of abortions in New York nor prevent Virginians from traveling 
to New York to obtain an abortion.174 Nor could Virginia bar another 
state's citizen from disseminating information about an activity that is 
legal in that statePs 
Justice Blackmun did not, however, expressly prohibit Virginia from 
suppressing· the publication of information that is readily available to 
its citizens through sources beyond Virginia's police powers. It better 
suited Justice Blackmun's doctrinal purpose to make the point in re-
verse, positing the unthinkable spectacle of Virginia trying to keep 
The New York Times and Time magazine from crossing its borders.i76 . 
Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 177 decided the following year, gave even 
broader constitutional protection to commercial speech, the notion 
that commercial speech protected in one state must be protected in all 
states never advanced beyond Bigelow's facts.178 This limitation re-
sulted partly from Blackmun's own judicial caution in refusing to ex-
tend the Bigelow principles to electronic media.179 In addition, a 
strong dissenting opinion by Justices Rehnquist and White, who would 
become the foremost antagonists of employing any sort of futility 
principle analysis in commercial speech and electronic media contexts, 
173. /d. at 822. 
174. /d. at 822-23. 
175. /d. at 824-25. Justice Blackmun stated that the statute was unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment because 
Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read 
about the New York services. It is, in effect, advancing an interest in shielding its citi-
zens from information about activities outside Virginia's borders, activities that Vir-
ginia's police powers do not reach. This asserted interest, even if understandable, was 
entitled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances. 
/d. at 827-28. 
176. Justice Blackmun argued that 
[i)f application of this statute were upheld under these circumstances, Virginia might 
exert the power sought here over a wide variety of national publications or interstate 
newspapers carrying advertisements similar to the one that appeared in Bigelow's 
newspaper or containing articles on the general subject matter to which the advertise-
ment referred. Other States might do the same. The burdens thereby imposed on pub-
lications would impair, perhaps severely, their proper functioning. 
/d. at 828-29 (footnote omitted). 
177. 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
178. Id. at 760-61, 764. 
179. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975). 
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also limited Bigelow's scope. 1~0 Justice Rehnquist also dissented from 
the majority's opinion in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission of New York, 181 a case that ultimately halted 
the expansion of commercial speech protection by enunciating a spe-
cific test by which lower courts could assess the constitutionality of 
any advertising regulation.182 But Justice Rehnquist used the Central 
Hudson test, cynically perhaps, to uphold a Puerto Rico law which 
restricted gambling advertising in the next important commercial 
speech regulation case to come before the Court, Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.183 In so doing, he ex-
plicitly rejected the futility principle as applied to commercial 
speech.184 
In Posadas, the Court upheld legislation prohibiting gambling casi-
nos from advertising their services to the Puerto Rican public, even 
though gambling was legal for both tourists and Puerto Ricans.185 The 
Commonwealth Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the law, al-
lowing gambling establishments to advertise within Puerto Rico, pro-
vided the advertisements were directed at tourists and not Puerto 
Rican residents.186 Justice Rehnquist found that the legislation met 
180. /d. at 829 (Rehnquist and White, J.J., dissenting). 
181. 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
182. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the 
Supreme Court struck down certain Public Service Commission regulations which prohibited 
utilities in that state from promoting the use of electricity. /d. at 563-64. The Court held that the 
First Amendment protected commercial speech if it was neither false nor misleading. /d. The 
Court further held, however, that States could regulate commercial speech by measures that 
directly advanced a substantial governmental interest and were no more extensive than neces-
sary to promote the asserted interest. /d. The above holding. became known as the "Central 
Hudson test." Subsequently, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court interpreted the second prong of the test as requiring only a 
"reasonable fit" between the asserted interest and the regulation. /d. at 480. 
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, found that the Central Hudson test was incon-
sistent with the Court's prior cases and provided inadequate protection for commercial speech. 
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Conversely, Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that the test would unduly impair state legislatures' ability to promote important state 
interests. /d. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
183. 478 u.s. 328 (1986). 
184. See id. at 340-44 (analyzing the commercial speech at issue under the Central Hudson 
four-part test without addressing the possible futility of the restraint). 
185. /d. at 332. 
186. ld. at 335. The Court's interpretation of the law 
allow[ed], within the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico, advertising by the casinos addressed 
to tourists, provided they do not invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino, 
even though said announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident. Within 
the ads of casinos allowed by this regulation figure, for illustrative purposes only, ... 
the ads of casinos in magazines for distribution primarily in Puerto Rico to the tourist 
... even though said magazines may be available to the residents and in movies, televi-
sion, radio, newspapers and trade magazines which may be published, taped, or filmed in 
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the Central Hudson test,1B7 and rejected any notion that the regula-
tion's underinclusiveness would deprive it of its constitutional valid-
ity.188 Further, Justice Rehnquist rejected Justice Stevens' dissenting 
argument that the statute impermissibly discriminated among differ-
ent publications and audiences.1B9 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist dis-
missed all counterarguments by insisting that Puerto Rico's "greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the 
lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."190 
the exterior for tourism promotion in the exterior even though they may be exposed or 
incidentally circulated in Pueno Rico. For example: an advertisement in the New York 
Times, an advertisement in CBS which reaches us through Cable TV, whose main objec-
tive is to reach the potential tourist. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, App. to 
Juris. Statement at 38b-40b ). 
187. Jd. at 341-44. Under the Central Hudson test, courts must analyze commercial speech 
regulations using the following four factors: 1) whether the restricted speech is misleading or 
fraudulent; 2) the strength of the governmental interest in restricting the speech; 3) whether the 
restriction advances the government's intended interest; and 4) whether a reasonable "fit" exists 
between the government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
188. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342. 
189. Id. at 345 n.9. Justice Stevens argued that 
[u]nless the Court is prepared to uphold an Illinois regulation of speech that subjects 
the New York Times to one standard and the Chicago Tribune to another, I do not 
understand why it is willing to uphold a Puerto Rico regulation that applies one stan-
dard to the New York Times and another to the San Juan Star. 
I d. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, 
App. to Juris. Statement at 38b-39b). 
Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis, like Justice Blackmun's argument in Bigelow, avoids 
any express reference to the futility principle: 
With respect to the audience, the newly construed regulations plainly discriminate in 
terms of the intended listener or reader. Casino advertising must be "addressed to 
tourists .... " It must not "invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino .... " 
The regulation thus poses what might be viewed as a reverse privileges and immunities 
problem: Puerto Rico's residents are singled out for disfavored treatment in compari-
son to all other Americans. But nothing so fancy is required to recognize the obvious 
First Amendment problem in this kind of audience discrimination. I cannot imagine 
that this Court would uphold an Illinois regulation that forbade advertising "ad-
dressed" to Illinois residents while allowing the same advertiser to communicate his 
message to visitors and commuters; we should be no more willing to uphold a Puerto 
Rico regulation that forbids advertising "addressed" to Puerto Rico residents. 
Id. at 360 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting App. to Juris. Statement at 386-396). 
190. Id. at 345-46. Commentators have seriously challenged the validity of the Posadas deci-
sion. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. 
RES. L. REv. 411, 488 (1992) ("[T]he [Posadas] Court failed to fulfill its constitutional function 
to determine independently the free speech value of the expression in question . . . . Instead, the 
Court blindly deferred to social regulation."); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of 
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 649 n.74 (1990) ("[I]t is not clear that the power to 
regulate a specific economic activity necessarily comprises the power to regulate speech about 
that activity. After all, the Constitution does not forbid legislation abridging the freedom of 
gambling; it does forbid legislation abridging the freedom of speech."); Philip B. Kurland, 
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If the Posadas court could disregard the futility principle with re-
spect to printed commercial speech, it should have come as no sur-
prise that the Court would again reject it when analyzing broadcast 
commercial speech. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 191 for 
example, the Court summarily affirmed a Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) ban on airing tobacco advertisements.192 Subse-
quently, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,193 Justice White 
put the last nail in the coffin by upholding an FCC regulation that 
restricted radio lottery advertisements. 
Edge Broadcasting Co. involved a radio station which was licensed 
to serve a North Carolina community near that state's border with 
Virginia.194 More than 90 percent of its listeners resided in Virginia, 
and the station derived 95 percent of its advertising revenue from Vir-
ginia sources.195 The regulation prevented Edge's WMYK-FM, or 
"Power 94," unlike Virginia-based competitors addressing a virtually 
identical market, from sharing in the revenues of Virginia's aggres-
sively advertised state lottery.196 This restriction resulted from the 
fact that North Carolina sponsored no state lottery and prohibited res-
Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: " '7Was Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas 
Pitiful, '7Was Wondrous Pitiful", 1986 SuP. Cr. Rev. 1, 6 ("When Oliver Wendell Holmes told us 
that: 'The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience,' he was not suggesting the 
abandonment of reason."); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New 
Words with an Old Meaning, 72 MINN. L. Rev. 289, 290-91 (1987) ("[T]he Court retreated to a 
deferential standard of review reminiscent of thinking associated with its abandoned view that 
commercial expression is unprotected. Reversion to such analysis mocks the constitutional sta-
tus of commercial speech."); Mary B. Nutt, Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial 
Speech, 41 VAND. L. Rev. 173, 204-05 (1988) ("The Court's decision in Posadas appears to re-
treat to the position in Valentine v. Chrestensen that commercial advertising is wholly unworthy 
of constitutional protection. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, who authored the opinion in Posadas, 
previously had expressed a desire to return to Chrestensen in his dissenting opinions."); Freder-
ick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CINN. L. 
Rev. 1181, 1182 (1988) ("[T]he simple irreconcilability of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico with both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council and the four-part test of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission produces a situation in which almost all of the foundational questions about 
first amendment protection for commercial speech remain on the table for consideration and 
reconsideration."); The Supreme Court- Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. Rev. 100, 178 (1986) 
("Had Justice Rehnquist applied the Central Hudson test with vigor, he would have struck down 
Puerto Rico's law on the ground that it was enacted in pursuit of too insubstantial a purpose to 
justify the interference with individual choice."). 
191. 405 u.s. 1000 (1972). 
192. /d. For the facts of Capital Broadcasting Co., see 333 F. Supp. 582 (D. D.C. 1971). 
193. 113 s. Ct. 2696 (1993). 
194. /d. at 2701-02. See generally Tara L. Lavery, Note, Commercial Speech Suffers a First 
Amendment Blow: United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 14 N. ILL. U.L. Rev. 549 (1994) 
(discussing the reduced protection afforded commercial speech). 
195. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702. 
196. /d. 
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idents from participating in or advertising out-of-state lotteries.197 
Congress supported that prohibition by only allowing stations licensed 
to a community within a lottery state to broadcast information con-
cerning state-run lotteries.198 Edge Broadcasting sought a declaratory 
judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia stating that the federal statute and corresponding FCC regula-
tions were unconstitutional as applied to WMYK-FM.199 
Finding the "legality of advertising about the Virginia lottery . . . 
undisputed," the district court analyzed the case under the remaining 
three elements of the Central Hudson test.2oo Although it determined 
that the federal government had a substantial interest in supporting 
North Carolina's effort to discourage participation in lotteries, the 
court found that the federal statute provided an "ineffectual means" 
of reducing lottery participation by North Carolina residents.201 The 
court reasoned that since a majority of the North Carolina residents in 
the station's signal area received their information from Virginia-
based media, the number of listeners who might receive significantly 
less lottery advertising because of the statute's restrictions on Edge 
Broadcasting would be too small to "directly advance" the govern-
ment's interest.202 According to the district court, the law would not 
affect the volume of Virginia lottery advertising reaching North Caro-
lina residents; because the amount of money earmarked for broad-
casting Virginia lottery commercials in the area was largely 
determined without regard to how many different broadcasters would 
share it, once a budget was fixed, the money would simply be allo-
cated among the broadcasters who were available to take it.203 There-
fore, if Power 94 did not receive any of this designated revenue, other 
broadcasters would take up the slack.204 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis and found that 
197. /d. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289 & 14-291 (1993)). 
198. /d. at 2701 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 & 1307 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
199. /d. at 2702. 
200. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
201. /d. at 639. 
202. /d. 
203. /d. at 640-41. 
204. Id. at 641. 
/d. 
Thus, those statutory provisions fail materially to protect North Carolina residents from 
the harms which may result from lottery advertising. Given that degree of ineffective-
ness, those provisions do not meaningfully address the concerns of North Carolina or 
federalism's concerns for those state interests, and do not pass muster under the third 
prong of the Central Hudson test. 
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the prohibition did not effectively shield North Carolina residents 
from lottery information.zos 
The Supreme Court refocused the third prong of the Central Hud-
son test on the regulatory scheme as a whole, rather than as applied to 
Edge in this case.206 Thus, Justice White found that the statutes di-
rectly advanced the government's objective, which he characterized as 
"balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery [ s ]tates. "207 Conse-
quently, Justice White easily found a "reasonable fit" sufficient to sat-
isfy the fourth prong.zos In a part of the opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Souter, Justice 
White specifically addressed the futility argument advanced by the 
district and appellate courts.209 Justice White found those courts 
"wrong in holding that, as applied to Edge itself, the restriction at 
issue was ineffective and gave only remote support to the Govern-
ment's interest."210 Justice White argued that the government's inter-
est was sufficiently served by the supposition that 11 percent of the 
radio listening time of 127,000 North Carolina residents would be free 
from lottery advertising.211 It is not clear whether Justice White disbe-
lieved or merely failed to understand the district court's observation 
that Virginia allocated a fixed pre-budgeted volume of its advertising 
budget to North Carolina residents regardless of Edge Broadcasting's 
participation in that market. In any case, White did not address it. It 
was enough for Justice White was that the government advanced its 
205. See Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1992) ("This ineffec-
tive or remote measure to support North Carolina's desire to discourage gambling cannot justify 
infringement upon commercial free speech."). Writing in dissent, Judge Widener sounded one 
of the same themes that Justice White adopted when Edge Broadcasting reached the Supreme 
Court: 
I think it a mistake to hold, as we do, that those statutes as applied are invalid because 
Jess than 2% of North Carolina's total population are exposed to the broadcast of 
WMYK-FM. And the fact that such 2% may be exposed to the broadcasts from Vir-
ginia does not alter the fact that Congress has the undoubted right to enact the legisla-
tion which it did. The fact that the legislation does not uniformly succeed in all 
instances is no reason to hold it unconstitutional. 
Another objection to this decision is that as a practical matter the electromagnetic 
waves of immense numbers of radio and television broadcasts, probably a majority of 
them, cross state lines, so if our decision is carried to its logical conclusion, as it will be, 
it will serve to completely invalidate the statutes involved. 
/d. at 63 (Widener, J., dissenting). 
206. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, at 2699, 2704 (1993). 
207. /d. at 2704. 
208. /d. at 2705. 
209. /d. at 2706-08. 
210. /d. at 2706. 
211. See id. ("If Edge is allowed to advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage of listening 
time carrying such material would increase from 38% to 49%. We do not think that Central 
Hudson compels us to consider this consequence to be without significance."). 
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purpose "by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even where it 
[was] not wholly eradicated."212 
Justices Scalia and O'Conner declined to join in that part of Justice 
White's opinion, but did not write separately.213 Justices Stevens and 
Blackmun dissented, with Justice Stevens looking back to Bigelow for 
support.214 Justice Stevens rejected the characterization of Bigelow as 
turning on the constitutionally protected right to an abortion as im-
plied by Justice White in Edge Broadcasting215 and asserted by Justice 
Rehnquist in Posadas.216 Justice Stevens argued that "Bigelow is not 
about a woman's constitutionally protected right to terminate a preg-
nancy. It is about paternalism, and informational protectionism. It is 
about one State's interference with its citizens' fundamental constitu-
tional right to travel in a state of enlightenment, not government-in-
duced ignorance."217 Although Justice Stevens limited the rest of his 
dissent to disputing the substantiality of the government's interest, he 
had further occasion to discuss his interpretation of Bigelow in a con-
curring opinion in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 21s 
In Coors Brewing, the futility of the government's ban on printing 
the alcohol content of beer and malt liquor on container labels was so 
clear that even Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in rejecting the ban.219 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas concluded that such a restric-
tion could not "directly and materially advance" the government's as-
serted interest in preventing strength wars "because of the overall 
irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme."220 In particu-
lar, Justice Thomas pointed out that the regulations in question pro-
hibited brewers from printing the alcohol content on beer bottle 
labels, except where state law required disclosure of such informa-
212. /d. at 2707. 
213. Id. at 2700. 
214. /d. at 2709 (Stevens and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). 
215. See id. at 2703 ("[T]he activity underlying the relevant advertising - gambling - impli-
cates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category of 'vice' activity that could 
be, and frequently has been, banned altogether."). 
216. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) ("In Carey 
[v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),] and Bigelow [v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)], 
the underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally 
protected and could not have been prohibited by the State .... In our view, the greater power 
to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of 
casino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite."). 
217. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,113 S. Ct. 2696,2710 (1993) (Stevens and Black-
mun, J.J., dissenting). 
218. 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594-97 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
219. /d. at 1578. 
220. Id. at 1550. 
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tion,221 while other federal regulations prohibited advertisers from 
disclosing the beer's alcohol content only where state law also barred 
disclosure.222 After Coors Brewing, therefore, it seems that- despite 
Posadas and Edge Broadcasting - the public availability of informa-
tion by other means can sometimes defeat governmental efforts to 
suppress it, even in the commercial speech context.223 The remaining 
parts of this Article will further develop and refine this futility princi-
ple and apply it to new First Amendment challenges. 
II. THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE EXAMINED 
A. Defining the Futility Principle 
The core speech cases discussed above demonstrate that either the 
First Amendment or a common law rule of near-constitutional weight 
imposes a presumption against the validity of government efforts to 
suppress speech-whether the suppression is by prior restraint, denial 
of access, or subsequent punishment - where suppression would be 
futile because that speech is available to the same audience through 
some other medium or at some other place. Far from refuting this 
presumption of invalidity, the commercial speech cases show only that 
the presumption is more easily overcome where the speech in ques-
tion is accorded reduced First Amendment protection. Because the 
courts do not acknowledge this presumption, the cases offer only ob-
lique guidance as to its contours. In this Part, the Article describes the 
presumption of invalidity raised by the futility principle and examines 
221. /d. 
222. /d. 
/d. 
As only 18 States at best prohibit disclosure of content in advertisements ... brewers 
remain free to disclose alcohol content in advertisements, but not on labels, in much of 
the country. The failure to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising, 
which would seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war than 
labels, makes no rational sense if the government's true aim is to suppress strength 
wars. 
223. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (striking down 
Oklahoma's prohibition against cable operators' carrying out-of-state liquor commercials on fed-
eral pre-emption grounds). Justice Brennan minimized the state's interest in discouraging liquor 
consumption by noting that, "Oklahoma has chosen not to press its campaign against alcoholic 
beverage advertising on all fronts." He pointed out that state law 
permit[ed] both print and broadcast commercials for beer, as well as advertisements for 
all alcoholic beverages contained in newspapers, magazines, and other publications 
printed outside the State. The ban at issue in this case [wa]s directed only at wine 
commercials that occasionally appear[ed) on out-of-state signals carried by cable 
operators. 
/d. at 715. 
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how it can be overcome in a specific case. In so doing, the Article 
relies as much as possible on settled case law.zz4 
Fundamentally, the futility principle says that government action to 
suppress speech must be effective to be valid. At this level, the "effec-
tiveness" required is more mechanical than substantive. For example, 
it is not the futility principle that requires a valid gag order to effec-
tively protect the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
Higher constitutional principles serve that function. The futility prin-
ciple merely recognizes that a gag order, to be effective, must stifle the 
targeted information. If it fails to do even that much, the futility prin-
ciple renders the order invalid. Thus, no need exists to reach the more 
difficult questions regarding the susceptibility of jurors to prejudicial 
publicity or the efficacy of judicial admonitions. 
The simplicity of this formulation tends to mask the true complexi-
ties of the issue. To better understand the futility principle, imagine a 
delicately balanced scale with the speech interest on one side and the 
suppression interest (e.g., privacy or national security) on the other. 
Certain factors operate to tip the scale one way or the other. When 
the government suppresses speech through the use of a prior restraint, 
for instance, the scale tips toward the speech interest, prior restraints 
being historically disfavored. By contrast, if the regulation suppresses 
commercial speech, the scale tips toward the suppression interest, 
commercial speech having less First Amendment value. 
Under this analysis, the futility principle invariably causes the scale 
to tip toward the speech interest. Moreover, where the futility princi-
ple enters the balance opposite a prior restraint, the combination 
weighs so heavily in favor of the speech interest that the presumption 
against suppression appears all but irrebuttable. To illustrate, in 
United States v. Progressive, Inc., once the media published the es-
sence of the Progressive's pending H-bomb article, the government 
recognized that, despite the possibility of nuclear annihilation, it 
would be futile to suppress Progressive's further publication of the 
information. Similarly, lesser harms, like those relating to Paula 
Jones's privacy and reputational interests in Jones v. Turner, should 
never support injunctive relief once the information is publicly avail-
able, even if the court may be able to contain plaintiff's injury some-
what by restricting the information's dissemination; the remedy more 
appropriately lies in criminal sanctions or money damages if the cause 
of action is proven. 
224. The author does not attempt, however, to disguise his position as an advocate of the 
proposition that public speech is free speech which should be free to any speaker, to any audi-
ence, and in any place. 
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In the access context, where the speech and suppression interests 
are more evenly balanced, the futility principle also works to diminish 
the state's interest in suppression and thus tip the scale in favor of 
access. The futility principle does not guarantee journalists the right 
to attend criminal trials or report on the proceedings; again, higher 
constitutional principles perform that function. But the futility princi-
ple does grant journalists access to embarrassing videotaped evidence, 
confidential police records, and secret grand jury testimony that has 
already become public knowledge.225 One must ask: "How important 
can the government's asserted interest in suppression be if it allows 
access to some arbitrarily chosen members of the public or to the en-
tire world via some other medium?" 
The same logic seems to be at work in the subsequent punishment 
cases, although its formulation may be somewhat different. For exam-
ple, the futility principle may operate on a subconstitutionallevel, de-
priving a plaintiff of an element of the invasion of privacy tort.226 At a 
constitutional level, it may expose an underinclusiveness that will be 
fatal to a criminal statute. In either case, the futility principle almost 
irretrievably diminishes the state's interest in suppression. 
The futility principle also functions to diminish the government's 
suppression interest in the regulatory context. Here, however, there-
sulting underinclusiveness is not necessarily fatal. Constitutional doc-
trine allows the state to regulate speech of lesser value, such as 
commercial speech, and it allows that regulation to be incremental.227 
Not only is the speech interest diminished in the commercial context, 
but the fact that the speech in question may be otherwise available 
does not always diminish the suppression interest enough to defeat 
the regulation. Thus, the presumption of invalidity is apparently re-
buttable, at least in the regulatory context. 
225. The author also submits that the futility principle will ultimately unlock courtrooms 
everywhere to video coverage (the Judicial Conference and the O.J. Simpson trial notwith-
standing). 
226. Indeed, the privacy tort itself is premised on the thought that "to whatever degree and in 
whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication under consider-
ation has been made, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn." Louis D. Brandeis & 
Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 215 (1890). 
227. See supra notes 165-223 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation of commercial 
speech}. Note, however, Justice Brennan's dictum in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, where he 
argued that 
[a)lthough a state regulatory scheme obviously need not amount to a comprehensive 
attack on the problems of alcohol consumption in order to constitute a valid exercise of 
state power under th~ 1\venty-first Amendment, the selective approach Oklahoma has 
taken toward liquor advertising suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it 
asserts here. 
467 u.s. 691, 715 (1984). 
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· A closer examination of the commercial speech cases reveals, how-
ever, that - except for Posadas, which by common consensus was 
wrongly decided228 - the more closely the asserted suppression inter-
est lies to the content of the speech in question, the more likely the 
balance will weigh in favor of the speech interest.229 To illustrate, the 
futility principle allowed the Court to sustain the regulation at issue in 
Edge Broadcasting because the federal government's interest in main-
taining a neutral posture vis-a-vis state lottery advertising is remote 
from the content of those commercials and unaffected by the availa-
bility of the information.230 By contrast, the suppression interest in 
Coors Brewing - preventing strength wars - directly related to the 
content of the labelling; therefore, the Court justifiably struck down 
the regulation at issue on the ground that suppression is futile when 
the alcohol content is advertised elsewhere.231 
The significance of the relationship between the content of the 
speech and the suppression interest leads directly to the question of 
how the government can overcome the presumption of invalidity 
raised by the futility principle in a specific case. This Article submits 
that the government can defeat the presumption only where it asserts 
an important interest that is only marginally related to the content of 
the speech and where the regulation will directly advance that interest 
notwithstanding the public availability of the speech in question. Such 
a rule provides the only reasonable explanation for the outcome of 
Edge Broadcasting, but must be tested to see if it holds up in other 
contexts. 
For example, in the constitutional privacy cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently refused to foreclose the possibility that the 
press might be sanctioned for publishing information obtained unlaw-
fully, where the same information lawfully obtained could be pub-
lished without liability.232 Perhaps the Court awaits an appropriate 
case to determine whether a governmental interest in deterring unlaw-
ful newsgathering, which is distinguishable from the content of the 
228. See supra note 190 (detailing several articles written in response to the Posadas decision 
in which commentators have contended that the Court erroneously reverted to a former time 
when commercial speech was afforded insufficient protection). 
229. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court's decision in 
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 {1986)). 
230. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 {1993)). 
231. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995)). . 
232. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-104 {1979) {furnishing 
heightened First Amendment protection for puublishing lawfully obtained information). 
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speech, could overcome the presumption raised by the futility 
principle.233 
At a common law level it appears the Court agrees that a govern-
mental interest in minimizing injury to a plaintiff's reputation is suffi-
cient to justify imposing liability on the republisher of a libel, even 
though that interest directly relates to the speech's content.234 In the 
absence of a recognized futility principle to protect republishers, this 
potential liability perhaps explains and justifies the invention of such 
defenses as neutral reportage235 and reasonable reliance on a wire 
service.236 
Of all the cases examined in Part I of this Article, the access cases 
offer the clearest support for proposition that important governmental 
interests unrelated to content can overcome the futility presumption. 
Consider the Supreme Court's refusal to find any constitutional right 
to televise trials, while otherwise making trials among the most acces-
sible of all governmental functions.237 This Article has already dis-
cussed the origins of the Court's animosity toward cameras and noted 
some common justifications: prejudicial effect on the jury, disruption 
of the trial process, and grandstanding by parties and witnesses. Ap-
plying the futility principle, these common justifications can be char-
acterized as governmental interests unrelated to content which the 
government can assert to overcome the presumption of accessibility. 
After the O.J. Simpson experience, we might add the justification of 
preserving respect for the judicial system.z3s 
233. It should not surprise the reader that the author does not believe such a rule should 
prevail; the fact that it might is sufficient to make the point here. 
234. See Hutchinson v. Poxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979) (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 
306, 314-15 (1973), which held that a Congress member's republication of libelous material sub-
jects him to liability). 
235. The neutral reportage doctrine supplies First Amendment protection to accurate and 
unbiased reporting of newsworthy charges regarding a public figure. See, e.g., Edwards v. Na-
tional Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (refus-
ing to hold a republisher liable for accurately and objectively reporting the libelous utterance of 
a responsible spokesman on a matter of public controversy). The concept does not require the 
reporter to be free from uncertainty about the validity of the claims before he or she reports 
such charges. /d. 
236. See, e.g., Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Mass. 1985) (reliev-
ing newspapers that relied entirely upon established wire services without independent corrobo-
ration from liability for printing libelous information). 
237. See Reske, supra note 79, at 28 (conveying the majority's view that broadcasting judicial 
proceedings could potentially threaten defendants' right to a fair trial). 
238. The author believes that the Court will eventually find a ban on cameras in the court-
room no longer directly advances these interests (assuming that it ever did), that the process is 
far better served by the presence, as opposed to the absence, of cameras and that no constitu-
tional justification exists for barring television from every courtroom. 
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Finally, although few governmental interests appear sufficient to 
overcome the combination of historical hostility to prior restraints and 
the futility principle, one such interest may be the protection of intel-
lectual property through injunctive relief allowed for copyright239 or 
trademark240 infringement. This interest is exclusively proprietary, ut-
terly unrelated to the content of the speech in question, and unques-
tionably advanced by injunctive relief. In addition, the protection of 
intellectual property enjoys the cachet of independent constitutional 
authorization.241 
In sum, the futility principle imposes a presumption of constitu-
tional stature against the validity of government efforts to suppress 
speech - whether by prior restraint, denial of access, or subsequent 
punishment - where suppression would be futile because that speech 
is accessible to the same audience through some other medium or at 
some other place. The government may rebut the presumption only 
where it asserts an important interest that is unrelated to the content 
of the speech in question and where suppression directly advances 
that interest. 
B. Justifying the Futility Principle 
Having defined the futility principle as it currently exists in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, this Article now considers why the Court 
ought to acknowledge the principle. In other words, what additional 
values are served by expressly recognizing the futility principle that 
are not now being realized. The cases suggest three important values 
that courts would be enhanced by formally recognizing the futility 
principle. First, the government would conserve resources that would 
otherwise be wasted in trying to "force the genie back into the bottle." 
Second, express recognition of the futility principle would increase re-
spect for the law and its servants, who tend to look foolish when they 
try to suppress publicly available speech. Third, such acknowledge-
ment would protect the integrity of the speech itself by increasing the 
number and diversity of information providers. 
When Justice White lamented that "a substantial part of the 
threatened damage" wrought by the theft and release of the Pentagon 
Papers has already occurred,242 he was acknowledging the futility of 
any further injunctive relief as a waste of time and judicial effort. Sim-
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994) (granting courts with jurisdiction the authority to award a 
temporary or permanent injunction to prevent copyright infringement). 
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) (providing injunctive relief for trademark infringement). 
241. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
242. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (J. White, concurring). 
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ilarly, when Chief Justice Burger spoke of restraining a whole commu-
nity from "discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it"243 
and when Justice Marshall spoke of restraining the "backyard gossip 
who tells 50 people,"244 they each called attention to the Sysyphean 
task of any court or legislature that would try to contain publicly avail-
able information. Likewise, when Justice Thomas decried "the overall 
irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme,"245 he was ex-
pressing his frustration with a wasteful and ineffectual bureaucracy. 
Taxpayers, who have precious little patience for such nonsense, will 
likely share Justice Thomas's frustration. How are taxpayers sup-
posed to respect a judicial system that denies one radio station the 
right to carry advertising that its audience hears anyway on another 
station? Or one that denies a magazine the right to carry factual in-
formation that is readily available in the public library? Or a system 
that refuses to grant the general public the right to see and hear evi-
dence that has already been played to a jury, the press, and the ordi-
nary citizens who were lucky enough to get seats in the courtroom? 
Assuming arguendo that some circumstances may exist in which 
containing or slowing the dissemination of publicly available informa-
tion has value and that the public will recognize and accept such value, 
there remains a bona fide concern that the government may jeopard-
ize the integrity of the information by imposing restraints on its dis-
semination. Thus, Chief Justice Burger warned that rumors, not 
covered by the Nebraska Press gag order, "could well be more damag-
ing than reasonably accurate news accounts" of the murders.246 Simi-
larly, Judge Gesell found "illuminating" the "aural atmosphere, 
emphasis and connotations" of President Nixon's taped conversations, 
information that the printed transcripts could not convey.247 And Jus-
tice Stevens branded as "paternalism," "informational protectionism," 
and "government-induced ignorance" the consequence of excessive 
controls on commercial speech.24s 
Underlying each of these expressions is the notion that the integrity 
of the information is best served by allowing it to be carried by many 
and varied information providers. This same multiplicity and diversity 
of voices has long been considered fundamental to the proper func-
243. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976). 
244. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989). 
245. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995). 
246. 427 U.S. at 567. 
247. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D. D.C. 1975). 
248. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,2717 (1993) (Stevens and Black-
mun, J.J., dissenting). 
1995] THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE 41 
tioning of the Millian marketplace of ideas.249 Yet this value is clearly 
threatened by the kind of discriminatory suppression that can be 
found in several of the cases discussed above. In Nebraska Press, Big-
elow, and Posadas, for example, the regulations at issue prevented the 
local media from publishing certain information while national and 
international media remained free to release the same information. In 
Daily Mail, the Court restrained the print media, but not broadcasters; 
and in Nixon, the Court constrained broadcasters, but not the print 
media. Finally, in Providence Journal and Edge Broadcasting, the 
court decisions shut a single information provider out of the competi-
tive marketplace. 
This type of discriminatory suppression affects the audience as well 
as the media, threatening what Justice White called the "paramount" 
right of the public to be informed and "capable of conducting its own 
affairs."250 The threat becomes especially serious as information be-
comes the driving force behind the modem economy; in contempo-
rary society, lack of access to information intensifies the disparity 
between the "haves" and "have nots."251 Given the government's de-
nial of information to Virginians about abortion services in New York, 
to Puerto Ricans about gambling in San Juan, and to North Carolini-
ans about lotteries in Virginia, what other information will the govern-
ment try to withhold from selected segments of the public?252 
249. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). In that case the Court explained that 
[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization 
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private [broadcast]licensee 
. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not consti-
tutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC. 
/d. at 390. 
250. /d. at 390, 392. 
251. Indeed, the objectives of the Clinton Administration's plan for developing a National 
Information Infrastructure include "extend[ing] the Universal Service concept to the informa-
tion needs of the American people in the 21st century." The National Information Infrastruc-
ture: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,028 (1993). See also Ralph J. Andreatta, The 
National Information Infrastructure: Its Implications, Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 WAKE 
FoREST L. REv. 221, 227 (1995) (explaining the impact that the Information Infrastructure will 
have on our future society). 
252. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,'215 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that restrictions on the ability of federally funded family planning clinics to counsel patients 
regarding abortion unconstitutionally suppresses truthful information about constitutionally pro-
tected conduct vitally important to the listener). Significantly, the restrictions at issue in Rust 
affected only those women who were dependent upon federally funded clinics for prenatal coun-
seling, i.e., those of lower socio-economic status. /d. at 178-191. 
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The futility principle advocated by this Article would minimize any 
discriminatory suppression, whether media-focused or audience-fo-
cused, and would help to preserve the integrity of information, the 
efficiency of government, and respect for the courts in an era of vast 
changes in the way in which we communicate with each other. To test 
these theories, this Article now turns to three legal issues which the 
new computer-assisted communications technology has generated and 
examines how the futility principle might influence the resolution of 
each. 
III. THE FuTILITY PRINCIPLE APPLIED 
A. Mayhem Manuals and the Internet 
On Apri119, 1995, a crude bomb made of diesel fuel and fertilizer 
destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
killing 167 men, women and children. The story dominated the media, 
including the Internet, where users exchanged information, spread ru-
mors, coordinated relief efforts, and argued about responsibility.253 
Several of those debates focused on the responsibility of the Internet 
itself, particularly its use by right-wing militants to disseminate their 
paranoid political ideas, anti-government propaganda and instruction 
in explosives and other weaponry.254 Within weeks of the bombing, 
politicians warned about the "dark underside" of the new 
technology. 255 
These politicians fully aired their concerns on May 11, 1995, when 
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 
Government Information conducted a hearing on "Mayhem Manuals 
and the Internet. "256 Then presidential hopeful Senator Arlen Spec-
ter chaired the hearing, opening with an introduction to the Internet 
253. John Schwartz & Howard Kurtz, Internet, Talk Radio Let Citizens Sound Off, WASH. 
PoST, Apr. 23, 1995, at A22. See generally Margot Williams, Internet Relay Chat: 'Breaker One-
Nine' for the '90s, WAsH. PoST, May 15, 1995, at F18 (explaining the Internet's increasing signifi-
cance in the media). 
254. John Schwartz, Advocates of Internet Fear Drive to Restrict Extremists' Access, WAsH. 
PoST, Apr. 28, 1995, at A22. 
255. /d. See also John F. Harris, Clinton Rejects 'Patriot' Claim of Armed Groups; Long Strug-
gle With Domestic Terrorism Foreseen, WASH. PosT., May 6, 1995, at A01 (quoting President 
Clinton, who stated that" 'technology like the Internet has a "dark underside" that, combined 
with America's traditional openness and liberty, leaves the nation "very, very vulnerable to the 
forces of organized destruction and evil""'). President Clinton further stated that " 'the great 
security challenge ... in the 21st century will be to determine how to beat back the dangers while 
keeping the benefits of this new time.' " /d. 
256. Mayhem Manuals and the Internet: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech-
nology, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, LEGIS library, CNGTST file [hereinafter Mayhem Hearings]. 
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that conveyed a sense of both awe and fear.257 Asserting that "pur-
veyors of hate and violence" communicate on the Internet, Senator 
Specter pointed to a 93-page on-line document entitled "Big Book of 
Mischief," which details how to make explosives.2ss He also cited an 
electronic mail posting that offered information on building a bomb 
like the one used in Oklahoma City, and he exhorted the subcommit-
tee to determine the extent of such usage and whether anything could 
or should be done to curb it.259 
Senator Specter explicitly acknowledged that these issues impli-
cated First Amendment concerns and implicitly considered the futility 
principle. He not only referred to the Progressive case in his opening 
remarks, but also called former U.S. Attorney for the Western District 
of Wisconsin, Frank Therkheimer, as a witness.260 Professor Th-
erkheimer helped prosecute the Progressive case almost 20 years ear-
lier and is now a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law 
School.261 In the course of the hearings, Professor Therkheimer spoke 
most eloquently against attempts to enjoin the dissemination of pub-
licly available information. In particular, Professor Therkheimer 
pointed out that information is neutral, that the Internet is only one of 
several means by which that information may be communicated, and 
that children do not have access "willy-nilly" to information on the 
Internet.262 Above all, Professor Therkheimer argued, "[t]he wide-
spread availability of information whose electronic transmission is to 
be enjoined argues conclusively ... against such extraordinary exer-
cise of government power."263 
257. Senator Specter explained that 
[t]he Internet is an international, cooperative computer network composed of over 
28,000 computer networks in 60 countries. The Internet links thousands of users of all 
types: governments, schools, libraries, corporations, non-profits, individuals, vinually 
all users of computers can gain access to the Internet. No one controls the Internet. It 
is a cooperative group of computer networks. It is the most democratic means of com-
munication today. Without going through an intermediary, a person on the Internet 
can communicate with all other users. The Internet represents a revolutionary form of 
mass communication. No longer does someone need to write a book that others must 
purchase or speak over the radio or television that others can turn off in order to reach 
mass audiences. No longer does a person who wishes to communicate have to rely on 
the vagaries of the market, of an editor, or time constraints. On the Internet, people 
from all over the world can communicate directly with each other. 
/d. (statement of Sen. Specter). 
258. ld. 
259. /d. 
260. /d. 
261. /d. (statement of Frank Therkheimer). 
262. /d. 
263. /d. To suppon his argument, Professor Therkheimer provided the following information: 
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If necessary, Professor Therkheimer suggested, Congress could 
criminalize the dissemination of information via electronic media by a 
person with knowledge that the dissemination was in furtherance of 
designated criminal activity.264 Professor Therkheimer suggested that 
Congress could base such a law could on the many examples already 
existing in Title 18 where Congress has addressed the criminal use of 
interstate facilities.265 Such measures would prove more effective 
than injunctive relief, he said, because arrest would prevent the crimi-
nal from using any means of communication to achieve his illegal end 
and would significantly minimize the risk of needless government in-
terference with legitimate activities.266 
Professor Therkheimer and other witnesses also raised First 
Amendment concerns, some seeing it a shield to be preserved, others 
as an obstacle to be overcome.267 Subcommittee member Senator Di-
/d. 
Attached to this statement is a copy of pages 275-282 of Volume 21 of the 1986 Ency-
clopedia Britannica. It reveals great detail on explosive manufacture, similar in many 
respects to the information disseminated electronically of concern to the Committee 
and others, including on page 279, a description of the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel oil 
mixture used in the Oklahoma City bombing. Also attached is a list of books containing 
similar information to the kind transmitted electronically. The books on this list were 
obtained from the Engineering and Agriculture libraries at the University of Wisconsin 
in the one day between the invitation to appear before this Committee and the prepa-
ration of this statement and are generally available. Among these books is a "Blasters 
Handbook" published by the Department of Agriculture Forestry Service which in tum 
includes a description of the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel Oil explosive used in Oklahoma 
City along with the recommended mixture of the two chemicals. 
264. /d. 
265. /d. Professor 1\Jerkheimer specifically mentioned (1) using the mails in furtherance of a 
scheme to defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994); (2) using wire facilities in furtherance of a scheme to 
defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994); (3) transporting an explosive in interstate commerce with in-
tent to unlawfully damage a building, 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); (4) traveling in interstate com-
merce or using any facility in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate designated illegal 
activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994); and (5) transmitting in interstate commerce any threat to injure 
another, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1994). /d. 
266. /d. 
267. Rabbi Marvin Hier of the Simon Wiesen thai Center, for example, denied advocating an 
attack on the First Amendment freedoms of Americans, but urged that law enforcement be "free 
to investigate clearly expressed intentions to commit violence." /d. (testimony of Rabbi Marvin 
Hier). Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, who 
insisted that no new laws were needed, supported current Justice Department guidelines that 
require "speech-plus" before launching a full-scale investigation. /d. (testimony of Jerry 
Berman). Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert S. Litt acknowledged the constraints im-
posed by the First Amendment but asked the committee to report "gap-filler" anti-terrorist leg-
islation proposed by President Clinton. /d. (statement of Robert S. Litt). William W. 
Burrington, speaking for the commercial on-line services represented by the Interactive Services 
Association, defended the full First Amendment protection now accorded to on-line communi-
cations, but promised to work with the subcommittee to "protect the interests of a free and safe 
society." /d. (testimony of William W. Burlington). 
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anne Feinstein, however, seemed to find this discussion irrelevant if 
not obstructionist. Expressing her annoyance with the witnesses' def-
erence to the First Amendment, Senator Feinstein remarked that, 
"You gentlemen are pushing the envelope to extremes. . . . I have a 
hard time with people using the First Amendment to teach others how 
to kill and to purvey that all over the world."268 Referring to the so-
called "Terrorist Handbook," Senator Feinstein said, "This isn't a re-
mote book hidden on the back shelf of a library that some physics 
student may find. It's going out on the internet to anybody who might 
have access to it and might want to engage in a terrorist act."269 When 
asked whether she would outlaw the same information in bookstores, 
she responded that "[t]here is a difference between free speech and 
teaching someone to kill."270 All we're doing here, she said, "is pro-
tecting [terrorist information] under the mantle of free speech."271 
Senator Feinstein vowed to attach an amendment to pending anti-
terrorist legislation272 that would make it a felony for any person " 'to 
disseminate by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in 
part, the manufacture of explosive materials if the person ... reason-
ably should know that' the materials are likely to be used to further a 
federal crime. "273 
On June 7, 1995, the Senate passed Senate Bill 735 (the "Compre-
hensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995"), which included a revised 
Feinstein amendment by a 91-8 vote.274 The Bill's version of the Fein-
268. "How to Make a Bomb"; Senate Subcommittee Eyes Curbs on Inflammatory Language on 
Internet, CoMM. DAILY, May 12, 1995, at 3. 
269. David Phinney, Feinstein May Propose Criminal Penalty for Teaching Bomb Making, 
STATES NEws SERVJCE, May 19, 1995. 
270. "How to Make a Bomb," supra note 268, at 3. 
271. Brock N. Meeks, Internet as Terrorist, CYBERWIRE DISPATCH, May 11, 1995, available on 
the Internet@ cwd-1 cyberwerks.com (on file with author). 
272. S.735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
273. Feinstein Amendment Would Censor Online Info. About "Explosive Materials," American 
Civil Liberties Union Cyber-Liberties Alert, May 26, 1995 (quoting preliminary draft of Fein-
stein Amendment) (on file with author). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attacked 
the draft on the ground that it covered "pure speech," without a particularized threat of vio-
lence, and thus would be unconstitutional. Id. The ACLU also argued that such a law was 
unnecessary since it is already a felony under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1994), to teach explo-
sives to any person if the teacher intends, or knows, or should know that the explosives will be 
used unlawfully to further a civil disorder. ld. 
274. The Amendment reads as follows: 
TITLE IX-Miscellaneous Provisions Sec. 901. Prohibition on Distribution of Informa-
tion Relating to Explosive Materials for a Criminal Purpose. 
(a) Section 842 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection: "(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demon-
strate the making of explosive materials, or to distribute by any means information 
pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture of explosive materials, if the person 
intends or knows, that such explosive materials or information will be used for, or in 
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stein amendment prohibits the distribution, by any means, of informa-
tion pertaining to the manufacture of explosive materials if the person 
intends or knows that such explosive materials or information will be 
used to commit a federal crime.21s 
If Congress adopts the Feinstein amendment as it appears in the 
Senate Bill 735, any challenge will undoubtedly implicate the futility 
principle. Assume, for example, that the proscribed information sub-
sequently appears in an anonymous post to a Usenet newsgroup276 
known to be frequented by right-wing radicals. Assume further that 
the poster belongs to a militia which trained regularly with firearms 
and explosives to defend the Constitution against the federal govern-
ment when the inevitable Armageddon arrived. The government ar-
rests, tries, convicts, and sentences him to 20 years in prison. 
On appeal, the poster might argue that the statute is facially uncon-
stitutional under Brandenburg v. Ohio,217 which requires both a sub-
jective intention on the part of the defendant to incite "imminent 
lawless action" and an objective likelihood that such action will ensue, 
before one may be punished for advocating the use of violence.278 In 
his statement at the Mayhem Hearings, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Robert S. Litt appeared to agree with civil libertarian Jerry 
Berman that Brandenburg would apply in this situation.279 Something 
more than mere words, such as a criminal conspiracy or some overt 
act, would be required to support the poster's prosecution. But Litt 
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense or a criminal pur-
pose affecting interstate commerce." 
(b) Section 844 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by designating subsection 
(a) as subsection (a)(1) and by adding the following new subsection: "(a)(2) Any per-
son who violates subsection (1) of section 842 of this chapter shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." 
141 CoNo. Rec. S7875 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). 
275. /d. The actual Senate language is narrower than that originally proposed by Senator 
Feinstein in that it requires considerably more certainty as to both scienter - by excluding one 
who "reasonably should know"- and the criminal nexus -by excluding information that will 
"likely" be used in a criminal way. 141 CoNG. Rec. S7684 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Biden). 
276. Usenet is an Internet service similar to an independent bulletin board system, which 
allows participants to post messages for others to read and to browse messages posted by others. 
Thousands of newsgroups exist on the Internet, covering topics that range from computers to 
religion to sex. 
277. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
278. /d. at 447. 
279. See Mayhem Hearings, supra note 256 (statement of Robert S. Litt) ("The First Amend-
ment protects speech, even speech that advocates or instructs illegal action, unless there is an 
imminent danger of, and an incitement to, lawless action, or unless the speech itself constitutes a 
crime."). 
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also referred to the Smith Act,280 which Scales v. United States2Bl held 
punished the teaching of revolutionary "techniques,"282 and the post-
Brandenburg case of United States v. Featherston,283 in which the Fifth 
Circuit upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 231284 of individuals 
who gave instructions at a meeting on how to make and assemble ex-
plosive and incendiary devices in order to prepare the attendees for 
"the corning revolution."28s 
Thus, Brandenburg would not necessarily control a case brought 
under the Senate's version of the Feinstein arnendrnent.286 Nor is it 
certain that an appellate court would require a criminal conspiracy or 
280. 18 u.s.c. § 2385 (1994). 
281. 367 u.s. 203 (1961). 
282. ld. at 233. Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., however, expressed serious doubts as to whether 
Brandenburg truly applies to the Smith Act cases of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
{1951), Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), 
and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Professor Kalvin argued that 
(t]he standard that emerged from those cases was incitement, but incitement adjusted 
to meet the problem of a group that is being organized to act not immediately but in 
the future .... But the standard announced in Brandenburg is incitement to immediate 
action. What then has become of the distinction between group and individual speech 
which seemed implicit in the earlier decisions? One possibility is that the Brandenburg 
Court intended to erase any such distinction .... It is also possible, however, that the 
Court regarded Brandenburg as an instance of individual speech and hence has pre-
served the group/individual distinction. Under such an approach the Yates incitement-
to-future-action standard would apply to group speech and the Brandenburg incite-
ment-to-imminent-action standard would apply to the individual speaker .... 
The question of whether a group, on analogy to conspiracy, is governed by different 
standards than the individual speaker when it is a matter of regulating content is a 
critically important one. For, as we saw in Scales, the Yates standard of incitement-to-
future-action, although a marked improvement over unfocused general advocacy, 
proves treacherously subtle in practice. Unfortunately, this question cannot be said to 
be settled by Brandenburg and so must await future clarification. 
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WoRTHY TRAomoN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 234 (Jamie 
Kalven ed., 1988). 
283. 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). 
284. 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1994) governs crimes and criminal procedure. 
285. United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1121. See also Mayhem Hearings, supra note 
261, (statement of RobertS. Litt) ("Because this presentation was made to a cohesive, organized 
group preparing for "the coming revolution," ready to strike quickly, and including some mem-
bers regularly trained in explosives, the court found no violation of the First Amendment."). 
286. Indeed, Senator Feinstein welcomed the opportunity her bill would provide for the 
Supreme Court to reconsider Brandenburg. During that Senate hearings on the amendment, 
Senator Feinstein stated that: 
[t]he last time the Supreme Court directly dealt with the issue of freedom of speech 
restrictions was over 20 years ago, in Brandenburg versus Ohio, 1969. As I understand 
it, this case involved a Ku Klux Klan leader's right to advocate destruction of property 
and other violence as a means of obtaining political reform. I think it may be time, 
especially in light of Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center bombings, for the 
Supreme Court to deal with this issue again. 
141 CoNo. REc. S7684 (daily ed. June 5, 1995). 
48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1 
imminent crime to affirm the conviction.287 The futility principle 
might not change that outcome, but it would force a court to closely 
examine the true effects of criminalizing readily available speech, 
rather than merely deferring to the fear, and perhaps guile, of a Presi-
dent and Congress reacting to a national tragedy. 
In particular, the futility principle would create a presumption that 
on-line bomb-making information constitutes protected speech, unless 
the government could demonstrate some interest, unrelated to the in-
formation itself, which suppression would directly advance. The only 
interest Congress asserted in passing the Feinstein Amendment was 
keeping bomb-making information out of terrorist hands. Such an in-
terest is not only content-focused, it is also very poorly served as long 
as bomb-making instructions are readily available in libraries, book-
stores, and encyclopedias in millions of homes.zss Any library patron 
who does not advise the librarian that he is a terrorist and plans to 
blow up a building would have access to the very same information as 
would be banned on the Internet. 
It is true of course that the legislation would deprive potential ter-
rorists of one communications channel by which to hatch their nefari-
ous schemes. To achieve that purpose, however, the government 
287. Although the Featherston Court did not expressly mention Brandenburg, it did quote 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950), in response to defendants' First Amendment 
argument: 
[I)t is urged ... that the statute was unconstitutionally applied because the govern-
ment failed to prove the happening or pendency of a particular civil disorder and thus 
failed to show a clear and present danger justifying an interference with activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment. We find this argument unpersuasive. 
The words "clear and present danger" do not require that the government await the 
fruition of planned illegal conduct of such nature as is here involved. As stated in 
Dennis v. United States, "[T)he words cannot mean that before the Government may 
act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and 
the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is 
attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they 
will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the government is 
required." 
Here the evidence showed a cohesive organized group, lead by Featherston and 
aided by Riley, engaged in preparation for "the coming revolution." This group in-
cluded a force regularly trained in explosives and incendiary devices, standing ready to 
strike transportation and communication facilities and law enforcement operations at a 
moment's notice. 
461 F.2d at 1122 (citations omitted) (quoting Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509). 
288. In addition to the references discussed above, evidence exists that a 1978 novel, The 
Turner Diaries, is among the more influential sources of bomb-making and -using instructions in 
right-wing militia circles. Marc Fisher & Phil McCombs, The Book of Hate; Did the Oklahoma 
Bombers Use a 1978 Novel as Their Guide?, WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 1995, at DOL The novel's 
publishers claim to have sold some 200,000 copies through "mail-order houses, radio pitches and 
gun show display tables." I d. 
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would also have to outlaw anonymous and encrypted communications 
over the Intemet,289 as well as monitor otherwise legitimate political 
activities, which could impose extraordinary costs in time, money, and 
personal privacy.29° Further, that intrusion could destroy public confi-
dence in computer-assisted communications media as free and safe 
fora in which the public can debate political issues - resulting in the 
loss of one of the world's most democratic institutions.291 
Beyond these concerns, any such legislation could actually feed the 
paranoia of the radical militia whose provocations led to its enact-
ment. The legislation could also force the few truly dangerous users 
to abandon a medium where the general public can read, respond to, 
and largely reject their ideas. This could cause these dangerous users 
to move underground, making law enforcement's legitimate function 
of apprehending and punishing criminals even more difficult.292 
Viewed in the light cast by the futility principle, the Senate's Fein-
stein amendment would either be invalidated or construed to require 
something more than subjective intent. Perhaps a reviewing court 
would even be disposed to forsake Dennis and Featherston and impose 
the safeguards that the Supreme Court wisely adopted in 
Brandenburg. 
B. The Memphis Obscenity Convictions 
In July 1993, United States Postal Inspector David H. Dirmeyer, 
based in Memphis, Tennessee, received a complaint from a self-de-
scribed computer "hacker" about a computer bulletin board system 
that offered photos and videos of nude children.293 Using a fictitious 
name, Inspector Dirmeyer subscribed to the Amateur Action Bulletin 
289. In fact, on June 27, 1995, Senator Charles Grassley introduced the Anti-Electronic Rack-
eteering Act of 1995, S. 974, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would create a new 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030A. The proposed section would make it unlawful 
to distribute computer software that encodes or encrypts electronic or digital commu-
nications to computer networks that the person distributing the software knows or rea-
sonably should know, is accessible to foreign nationals and foreign governments, 
regardless of whether such software has been designated nonexportable [unless] ... the 
software at issue used a universal decoding device or program that was provided to the 
Department of Justice prior to the distribution. 
Id. See infra part III.C (discussing cryptography export controls). 
290. See Mayhem Hearings, supra note 256 (statement of Jerry Berman). 
291. /d. See also I1HIEL DE SoLA PooL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 251 (1983) (stating that 
new electronic media "allow for more knowledge, easier access, and freer speech than were ever 
enjoyed before"). 
292. Mayhem Hearings, supra note 256 (statement of William W. Burrington). 
293. Affidavit of David H. Dirmeyer, U.S. Postal Inspector, before Wayne D. Brazil, U.S. 
Magistrate-Judge, Northern District of California, available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org 
(on file with author) (hereinafter Affidavit of David H. Dirmeyer]. 
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Board System, operated by Robert and Carleen Thomas of Milpitas, 
California.294 He then ordered several pornographic videotapes, and 
downloaded a number of pornographic images to his own 
computer.295 
The Thomases were arrested and tried before a jury in U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The jury convicted them 
in June 1994 for shipping obscene videotapes to Inspector Dirmeyer 
by common carrier in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462,296 and for trans-
porting obscene images by private conveyance in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1465.297 In December 1994, Robert and Carleen Thomas 
were sentenced to 37 and 30 months in prison, respectively.298 In 
March 1995, they were ordered to forfeit more than $18,000 worth of 
computer equipment used in their business.299 At the time of this Ar-
ticle's publication, Robert Thomas remained in prison pending appeal 
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Carleen Thomas was seek-
ing a new trial on the ground that she lacked independent and effec-
tive counsel at the first tria}.3oo 
This Article suggests that the futility principle presumptively invali-
dates the law under which the government convicted the Thomases 
because the obscenity standards by which the Thomas's service was 
judged allows the criminalization of speech in one location that is per-
fectly legal in another. Where the medium of transmission is mail, 
broadcast, cable, or telephone, the presumption may be overcome by 
the government's interest in supporting community standards of de-
cency and the relative effectiveness of its control; where the medium is 
computer-assisted communications, however, the balance may yield a 
different result. 
To convict the Thomases, prosecutors first had to persuade a jury 
that the materials which Inspector Dirmeyer had acquired from them 
were obscene. That determination, in turn, depended on three factors 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.301 The three 
Miller factors are 
294. /d. 
295. /d. 
296. 18 u.s.c. § 1462 (1994). 
297. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in 
support of Appellants at 4, Thomas v. United States, appeal filed, 6th Cir. 1995, (Nos. 94-6648 & 
94-6649), available on the Internet at gopher://aclu.org:6601 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief). 
298. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 4. 
299. Chris Conley, High-Tech Seized in Obscenity Case, CoM. APPEAL, Mar. 8, 1995, at 2B. 
300. Michael Kelley, Banned in Memphis, City Has High Profile in Obscenity Case History, 
CoM. APPEAL, June 1, 1995, at 1C. 
301. 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
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(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.302 
51 
While the third Miller factor contemplates a national, objective 
standard, the first two are based on contemporary community stan-
dards. As Chief Justice Burger wrote, "It is neither realistic nor con-
stitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the 
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct 
found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City."303 Following Chief 
Justice Burger's reasoning, Miller also dictates that the people of Las 
Vegas or New York City cannot be forced to live by the obscenity 
standards adopted by Maine or Mississippi, thus creating a geographi-
cal analog to the rule that an adult population may not be reduced to 
reading only what is fit for children.304 Consequently, a sexually ex-
plicit image might be considered obscene in Memphis, Tennessee but 
not in Milpitas, California. 3os 
The Thomases have said that they believed the material in their 
computers was legal because they purchased it from stores in San 
Francisco.306 Perhaps they actually did. After all, San Jose authorities 
declined to prosecute them after examining it. Moreover, the govern-
ment did not bring suit in San Francisco, but in Memphis, a city cele-
brated for its powerful and arbitrary Board of Motion Picture Censors 
and tradition of pornography prosecutions.307 Nonetheless, United 
302. /d. at 24 (citations omitted). 
303. /d. at 32. 
304. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
305. No finding exists as to whether the videotapes or scanned images in this case were ob-
scene under community standards in the San Francisco Bay area. Affidavit of David H. 
Dirmeyer, supra note 293. The San Jose police investigated the Thomases while looking for 
child pornography, but did not file any charges. ld. 
306. Howard Mintz, Offensive to Professional Standards, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at S35. 
307. Kelley, supra note 300, at 1C. In his article, Mr. Kelly recounted that legendary censor-
ship board chairman Lloyd Binford once banned the film Stromboli because 
[Stromboli's] star, Ingrid Bergman, and its director, Roberto Rossellini, were living to-
gether without a marriage certificate. He wouldn't permit the showing of Charlie 
Chaplin movies because of what he considered Chaplin's unsavory private life and 
politics. 
In 1954, what was described as "a sexy dance by Jane Russell" brought down his 
stamp of disapproval on French Line. 
The most embarrassing case of censorship here may have been the decision by 
Binford to ban the movie Curley because, as the chairman maintained in a letter to the 
United Artists Corp. and Hal Roach Studios in 1950, it portrayed white and black chil-
dren playing together, and "the South does not permit Negroes in white schools or 
recognize social equality between races, even in children." 
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States District Court Judge Julia Gibbons denied that the government 
had engaged in forum shopping.3os Judge Gibbons stated that she 
didn't "believe there are places in this country ... where this is not 
likely to be found obscene," and she rejected "[t]he suggestion "that 
this jurisdiction is anomalous, unlike any other."309 
In any event, Judge Gibbons applied the community standards of 
Memphis to the question of whether or not the graphic interchange 
formate (GIF) images were obscene. This was the only conclusion she 
could have reached consistent with the government's position that all 
of the Thomases' conduct involved interstate commerce; any other de-
cision would have amounted to an admission that the Thomases had 
not transported the material to Memphis and that their conduct was 
therefore not criminal. As to the GIF images themselves, no nexus 
existed between the Thomases and Memphis: they had not traveled to 
Memphis, solicited business there, nor physically "sent" the images 
there.310 
To protect the sensibilities of Memphis and similarly inclined com-
munities, Congress has made it a federal crime for someone in 
Milpitas to mail such material across state lines to Memphis.311 Con-
gress also has criminalized the operation in Milpitas of a commercial 
"dial-a-porn" telephone service which trafficks in obscene material 
and which is available in Memphis.312 The distributor bears the bur-
den of restricting delivery or service to those communities where the 
material is not considered obscene; the standards of the recipient com-
munity are those that matter under Miller.313 Congress has not, how-
ever, made it a crime for someone in Memphis to travel across state 
lines to Milpitas to view the very same material; if that person should 
/d. 
308. See Chris Conley, Calif. Couple Get Prison for Computer Porn Relayed Here, CoM. AP-
PEAL, Dec. 3, 1994, at 1A (reporting U.S. District Judge Julia Gibbons' views about the case). 
309. /d. 
310. The Tennessee postal inspector, who worked closely with a Memphis assistant U.S. attor-
ney in the sting operation that led to the Thomases' indictment, constituted the only active Mem-
phis participant in the pornography's delivery. He downloaded sexually oriented images, 
ordered a videotape, and sent an unsolicited child-pam video to the Thomases. Affidavit of 
David H. Dirmeyer, supra note 293. 
311. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994). See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (construing 18 
U.S.C. § 1461 as not requiring proof of a uniform national standard by which to judge obscen-
ity); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971) (explicitly holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 
prohibits the knowing use of the mail to deliver obscene material). 
312. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Sable Communications v. Federal Com-
munications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (construing 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) as prohibiting 
obscene interstate telephone conversations). 
313. See e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 125 (holding that the community standard 
where the material is distributed is the governing standard). 
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purchase the material in Milpitas and bring it back across state lines to 
Memphis, the seller in Milpitas will have committed no crime. The 
Thomases' case presents the issue of whether their conduct more 
closely paralleled the obscene mail and dial-a-porn cases, or the latter 
hypothetical traveler scenarios.314 
One ground on which a court of appeals could ultimately reverse 
the Thomases' convictions is that Congress had failed to explicitly 
criminalize the Thomases' conduct.315 The Senate has already passed 
a bill, however, which would do precisely that.316 If enacted, the bill 
would criminalize everywhere speech that is obscene anywhere, if ac-
cessible via computer networks, thus implicating the futility principle. 
A second, albeit less likely, ground on which an appeals court might 
reverse the Thomases' convictions rests on the notion that neither 
Milpitas nor Memphis represents the appropriate community upon 
which to base an obscenity determination. The ACLU and the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation as amici argued that the appropriate com-
munity standards would be those of the virtual (rather than 
geographical) community inhabited by members of the Amateur Ac-
314. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 18-19. 
315. The Thomas's conduct consisted of scanning pornographic images into their computers as 
GIF files, then allowing that information to be retrieved and transferred by telephone across 
state lines for a fee to a destination computer where the information could be downloaded into 
the recipient's computer and restored to a viewable image. Appellate court reversal of convic-
tions may increasingly occur in criminal cases which involve the Internet or other new communi-
cations technologies. In December 1994, for example, a federal district court dismissed criminal 
charges against a Massachusetts Institute of Technology student, Ralph LaMacchia, who had 
established a file repository on the Internet where users could upload and download copyrighted 
software. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994). The court found 
that Ralph LaMacchia did not profit or gain any commercial advantage from the infringements, 
which is an essential element of criminal infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). /d. at 539. The 
court suggested that Mr. LaMacchia's conduct probably deserved criminal sanctions, but Con-
gress, not the court, would have to impose them. !d. at 544. 
316. On June 15, 1995, the Senate approved the Telecommunications Competition and Dereg-
ulation Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995), which incorporated, as Title IV, the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 141 CoNo. REc. S8480 (daily ed. June 15, 1995). The 
CDA, originally proposed by Senators James Exon and Dan Coats, would establish fines of up to 
$100,000 and prison terms of up to two years for people who knowingly make, or make available, 
obscene communications, or send indecent material to minors, across electronic networks. /d. 
While the indecency language of the bill has been extremely controversial, civil libertarians 
specializing in Internet speech issues appear to have accepted its obscenity provisions. See, e.g., 
Constitutional Problems with the Communications Policy Amendment: A Legislative Analysis by 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 17, 1995 (on file with author) (stating that none of the 
CDA's prohibitions related to "obscene" communications raise any constitutional issues and that 
it is well-settled law that obscene content is not protected under the Constitution); CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, POLICY POST No. 19, June 20, 1995 (on file with author) (as-
serting that, under the First Amendment, Congress has broad power to ban obscenity, but can 
only regulate indecency in very narrow circumstances, such as in the broadcast media where 
there is a captive audience). 
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tion Bulletin Board System.317 Many scholars have written about the 
virtual communities created by computer-assisted communications,318 
and the idea has a certain appeal. Nonetheless, if the amici are cor-
rect, nothing constitutes obscenity in cyberspace, or at least in that 
corner of cyberspace visited by those who are looking for obscenity.319 
If a court of appeals recognized the futility principle, the first issue 
it would face is whether suppressing the speech would be effective or 
futile. The court should consider that, where the government is in a 
position to enforce its standards of decency, the effectiveness of the 
control and the importance of the interest served might combine to 
overcome any presumption of invalidity. Examples include the fed-
eral postal service, licensed broadcasters and cable operators, and reg-
ulated common carriers. The outcome may differ, however, in cases 
where the government cannot effectively control the content carried 
by a particular medium, such as on the highly decentralized and 
worldwide Internet. In particular, computers located in other coun-
tries store much of the pornography available on the Internet because 
such countries obscenity laws are typically more liberal or nonexis-
tent. The United States has no jurisdiction over these sites. It seems 
absurd for the United States to attempt to prosecute a resident of one 
foreign country, who posts a pornographic message on one of 
thousands of Internet newsgroups to a resident of another foreign 
country. Further, it would be equally absurd to attempt to prosecute 
an American who reads such a message in the privacy of his own 
home, or the commercial service which provided that American with 
access to the Internet. 320 
317. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 20-31; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation in support of Appellants, Thomas v. United States, appeal filed, 6th 
Cir. 1995 (Nos. 94-6648 & 94-6649), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legall 
cases/AABBS_Thomas (on file with author). 
318. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON 
THE ELEcrRONIC FRONTIER 38-64 (1993) (discussing the way that computers have created a new 
"counterculture"). 
319. The ACLU also has advanced the argument that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 
(1969), which held that states may not criminalize mere possession of obscene material other 
than child pornography, should apply, although it acknowledges that the Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to extend that case beyond its own facts. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 
297, at 28. See also, Michael I. Meyerson, The Right to Speak, the Right to Hear, and the Right 
Not to Hear: The Technological Resolution to the Cable/Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 137, 143 n.34 (1988) ("The Supreme Court has held that Stanley is not controlling in a case 
involving only speech or only privacy interests. Rather than treating Stanley as involving the 
combination of speech and privacy interest, the Court has somewhat inconsistently argued that 
Stanley rested only on whichever interest was not in the particular case before it."). 
320. See ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 26 ("If a Memphis resident obtains 
access to the Internet . . . and then simply reads messages on a board sent by a resident of 
1995] THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE 55 
It would also be impossible to enforce such a law, without poten-
tially destroy the Internet altogether. "Surely," as Justice Frankfurter 
said, "this is to burn the house to roast the pig."321 Thus, the govern-
ment could not assert a valid interest in suppressing pornography on 
the Internet, and any measure purporting to do so would be invalid. 
That does not mean that the government lacks weapons with which 
to protect children or nonconsenting adults from the evils it sees in 
this kind of speech. Entrepreneurs are developing technical "screens" 
to make pornographic material on the Internet inaccessible to chil-
dren.322 Moreover, the government remains free to criminalize the 
kind of pandering suggested by Chief Justice Warren in Roth v. United 
States323 and by Justice Brennan in a dissenting opinion in Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton. 324 Under such a rule, the Thomases would be free 
today. Accordingly, the legitimate interests of the state would be pro-
tected, the resources of the government and the courts conserved, and 
Finland to a resident of Japan ... is American law going to attempt to make the behavior of the 
service or of any of the three people involved illegal?"). 
321. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
322. One such filter, called Surfwatch, is already available to block sites on the Internet which 
contain pornographic information. Modern Anxiety: What to Do When Smut Rides the Internet?; 
Admirably, Senate Acts to Shield Kids, But Legislation May be Unworkable, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 
1995, at B6. 
323. 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J. concurring) (holding that "lewd and obscene" 
materials do not warrant constitutional protection). 
324. 413 U.S. 49, 105-113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan examined the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting juveniles and unconsenting adults from exposure to "obscene" 
materials and "pandering," which he seemed to find substantial, as well as preventing exposure 
that might lead even consenting adults to deviant or immoral behavior, which he clearly found to 
be invalid. He concluded that, "apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults," 
the interests of the state in suppressing sexual speech 
cannot justify the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's judi-
cial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution even of 
unprotected material to consenting adults ... [and held] therefore, that at least in the 
absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the 
First and the Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments 
from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their 
allegedly "obscene" contents. 
/d. at 112-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
On Jan. 29, 1996, the Sixth Circuit rejected all of appellants' arguments and affirmed the 
Thomases' convictions. U.S. v. Thomas, No. 96 C.D.O.S. 609 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1996) (slip op. 
available at on the Internet at http://www.callaw.com/tommy.html). The unanimous panel found 
that the Thomases' assigning a password to Dirmeyer, knowing he lived in Memphis, brought 
this case within the rule of Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). See supra note 312-13 
and accompanying text. Of particular interest vis-a-vis the Internet and its World Wide Web was 
the court's suggestion that the inability to identify the recipient community might preclude liabil-
ity. "If Defendants did not wish to subject themselves to liability in jurisdictions with less toler-
ant standards for determining obscenity, they could have refused to give passwords to members 
in those districts, thus precluding the risk of liability. Thomas, No. 96 C.D.O.S. 609, slip op. 
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respect for the judicial system would no longer be jeopardized by an 
arbitrary and unworkable obscenity standard. 
C. Cryptography Export Controls325 
If ever a case cried out for the benefits of a fully articulated futility 
principle, it is the case of Philip R. Karn, Jr., an electronics engineer 
from San Diego, California, who continues to struggle with the State 
Department and other federal agencies for the right to export a dis-
kette containing source code for about a dozen encryption algorithms. 
All of the code at issue appears in a book that has already been sold to 
some 20,000 people worldwide and is available in any bookstore. Yet 
the government's interpretation of federal law and regulation has pre-
vented Mr. Karn from exporting the diskette along with the book. 
Mr. Karn's case is only one of a number of on-going legal actions 
involving encryption technology, the once-arcane art that the new 
computer-assisted communications medium has catapulted into the 
spotlight of public attention. In stark conflict are the public's interests 
in the privacy, integrity, and authenticity of electronic transmissions 
and the government's interest in the ability to monitor those transmis-
sions when they are being made by, among others, terrorists, 
criminals, or pedophiles. One of the better known cryptologists 
caught up in this conflict is Philip Zimmermann. Mr. Zimmermann 
became the subject of a federal grand jury investigation after certain 
unknown parties placed his "Pretty Good Privacy" encryption system 
on the Internet, thus making it freely available to all the world.326 An-
other is Daniel J. Bernstein, a graduate student in mathematics at the 
University of California at Berkeley, who has sued the federal govern-
ment to allow him to publish his "Snuffle" encryption system and dis-
cuss it at public meetings, even though foreign nationals might attend 
such meetings. 327 
Once again, Philip Karn's case involves the government's attempt 
to suppress speech, albeit directed overseas, in spite of the fact that 
the same information is readily available both in the United States 
325. Cryptography consists of "the art or practice of preparing or reading messages in a form 
intended to prevent their being read by those not privy to secrets of the form." WEBSTER's 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfiONARY 548 (3d ed. 1986). 
326. On Jan. 11, 1996, the United States abruptly closed its three-year investigation of Philip 
Zimmermann. Assistant U.S. Attorney William P. Keane declined to comment on why the in-
vestigation was terminated, citing Justice Department policy. Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. Closes 
Investigation in Computer Privacy Case, WASH. PosT, Jan. 12, 1996, at All. 
327. The Electronic Frontier Foundation is supporting Bernstein's lawsuit. Richard Raysman 
& Peter Brown, Regulation of On-Line Services, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 22, 1995, at 3. The complaint, 
answer, and supporting documents in this case are available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org. 
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and abroad in another, easily converted medium. Again, the futility 
principle would make such suppression presumptively invalid. More-
over, as in the Thomases' case, the government could not overcome 
the presumption because no sound governmental interest could be di-
rectly advanced by the utterly futile attempt to suppress this speech.32B 
Before presenting the facts of Philip Karn's case, some background 
information on the applicable law is in order. At the height of the 
Cold War era, Congress enacted the Mutual Security Act of 1954,329 
which the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 superseded.330 The Mu-
tual Security Act gave the President "broad authority to identify and 
control the export of arms, ammunition and implements of war, in-
cluding related technical data, in the interest of the security and for-
eign policy of the United States."331 The President delegated his 
authority under the Act to the Department of State,332 which pub-
lished implementing regulations known as the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR).333 Willful violations of the Act or the 
Regulations are punishable by fines of up to one million dollars or ten 
years imprisonment or both.334 In addition, ITAR allows for the im-
position of civil penalties. 335 
The ITAR essentially establishes a list of "defense articles," called 
the United States Munitions List, to be controlled under the act.336 
The Regulations also define various controlled "defense services," in-
cluding the provision of technical data.337 In order to export either 
defense articles or services, an applicant must submit a Commodity 
Jurisdiction (CJ) request to see if a license is required.338 If the re-
viewing agency determines that a license is required, the would-be ex-
porter must register as an arms dealer339 and apply for a license. 340 
The Regulations include encryption systems, software, and algorithms 
328. This analysis differs from the above analyses only in the clarity with which it emerges 
unassisted from the narrative. 
329. 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (repealed 1976). 
330. 22 u.s.c. § 2778 (1988). 
331. Memorandum to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President, from John M. Har-
mon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (May 11, 
1978), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org (on file with author). 
332. Executive Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977). 
333. 22 C.P.R. §§ 120-130 (1995). 
334. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1988); 22 C.P.R. § 127.3 (1995). 
335. 22 C.P.R. § 127.10 (1995). 
336. Id. § 121.1. 
337. Jd. §§ 120.9(1) & (2). 
338. Jd. § 12D.4. 
339. ld. § 122.1. 
340. ld. § 123.1. 
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as "defense articles" on the Munitions List.341 Similarly, the ITAR 
considers the provision of information about cryptography a "defense 
service. "342 
On February 12, 1994, Philip Karn filed a CJ request with the State 
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) regarding a 
brand new book called "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algo-
rithms, and Source Code inC," by Bruce Schneier, published by John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.343 Mr. Karn stated that the book was widely avail-
able from retail stores or by mail order, that it contained encryption 
software source code listings that provided confidentiality, and that it 
provided sufficient information to allow for easy installation and 
use.344 He noted that some of the software included in the book 
originated in the United States, while some had come from abroad.34S 
Because of the book's public availability, Karn asked that ODTC re-
linquish jurisdiction over the book's export to the Commerce Depart-
ment, which would grant it a general license for "technical data 
available to all destinations."346 
Mr. Karn received word on March 2 that the Departments of Com-
merce and Defense had reviewed his CJ request and had effectively 
approved it with respect to the book.347 The letter, however, qualified 
its ruling, limiting the approval to "only the subject book and not the 
two source code disks that the book references and that are available 
from the author."348 Mr. Karn's original CJ request noted that the 
book did not include machine-readable media,349 but it did contain an 
offer by Schneier to supply a two-diskette companion software set. 
341. See id. § 121.1 (XIII}(b}(1} (providing that Auxiliary Military Equipment, includes 
"Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, inte-
grated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidenti-
ality of information or information systems"). 
342. /d. § 120.9. 
343. Letter from Philip R. Karn, Jr., to Maj. Gary Oncale, Office of Defense Trade Controls, 
U.S. Department of State (Feb. 12, 1994) [hereinafter CJ Request 038-94), available on the In-
ternet at http://www.eff.org/pub/LegaUCases/Karn_Schneier _exportlbook_1st.request (on 
file with author). 
344. /d. 
345. /d. 
346. /d. The Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations provide for un-
restricted export to any destination of information, or "technical data," that is already publicly 
available or will be made publicly available under prescribed circumstances. 15 C.F.R. § 779.3 
(a)(1) (1995). 
347. Letter from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Depart-
ment of State, to Philip R. Karn, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1994}, available on the Internet at http:// 
www.eff.org/pub/Legai/Cases/Karn_Schneier_exportlbook_1st. response (on file with 
author). 
348. /d. 
349. CJ Request 038-94, supra note 343. 
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Following his interpretation of a telephone conversation with an Of-
fice of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) official,350 Mr. Karn submit-
ted a second CJ request on March 9 seeking a general license for a 
single, $15 diskette 
strictly limited to the source code that already appears in the book, 
which you have already determined to be public domain. Character 
by character, the information is exactly the same. The only differ-
ence is the medium: magnetic impulses on mylar rather than inked 
characters on paper.3Sl · 
Upon request, Mr. Karn also sent a copy of the diskette to the Na-
tional Security Agency.3s2 
When Mr. Karn did not receive a response from ODTC in more 
than a month, he sent a letter expressing some irritation at having to 
file a second request at all.353 In the letter, Mr. Karn reiterated his 
comments from his first letter: "The only difference in this case is the 
recording medium; a floppy disk instead of printed page. I would 
have thought this an unimportant distinction that did not merit a sec-
ond CJ request; after all, typing skills are hardly unique to Americans 
and Canadians."354 In a telephone conversation with an ODTC offi-
cial, Mr. Karn learned that policy-makers were having some problems 
with his request.3ss 
When the response finally arrived, it was not the one Mr. Karn had 
expected. The ODTC told Mr. Karn the diskette would be designated 
a "defense article" on the Munitions List, requiring registration and 
license before export.356 The ODTC based its decision on the "added 
value to any end-user."357 The ODTC explained that each source 
code listing on the diskette was in a separate file capable of being 
350. Memorandum from Philip R. Kam, Jr., to Internet address gnu@cygnus.com (March 11, 
1994) (on file with author). 
351. Letter to Maj. Gary Oncale, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department of State, 
from Philip R. Karn, Jr. (March 9, 1994), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/ 
Cases/Kam_Schneier_export/floppy_2nd.request (on file with author). 
352. Letter to NSA 15-day CJ Request Coordinator from Philip R. Kam, Jr. (March 14, 
1994), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam_Schneier_export/ 
floppy_3rd.request (on file with author). 
353. Letter to Office of Defense Trade Controls from Philip R. Kam, Jr. (April 18, 1994), 
available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases!Karn_Schneier_export (on file 
with author). 
354. !d. 
355. Memorandum from Philip R. Karn, Jr., to electronic mail address 
<199405101906.MAA02319@unix.ka9q.ampr.org> (May 10, 1994) (on file with author). 
356. Letter to Philip R. Karn, Jr., from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Defense 
Trade Controls, Department of State (May 11, 1994), available on the Internet at http:// 
www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam_Schneier_export/floppy _2nd. response (on file with 
author). 
357. !d. 
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easily compiled into an executable subroutine, which, in some cases, 
would not be exportable if incorporated into a product.358 In other 
words, by saving an end-user the trouble of typing or scanning 
thousands of lines of code, the diskette became subject to export con-
trols that did not apply to the very same material in the book. 
Mr. Karn appealed the ODTC decision to the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Export Controls, denying any practical distinction be-
tween the book and the diskette.359 Mr. Karn pointed out that,"With 
the widespread availability of optical character recognition (OCR) 
equipment and software, even printed information such as the Book is 
easily turned into 'machine readable' disk files equivalent to those on 
the Diskette. "360 He also argued that the diskette qualified for a 
"public domain" exemption independent of the book, since the dis-
kette was readily available from the author and the software from 
many "anonymous FTP" repositories on the Internet, including many 
located outside the United States or Canada.361 
Mr. Karn also raised a First Amendment claim, citing a number of 
court decisions for the proposition that free speech is not automati-
cally subordinated to foreign policy considerations.362 Mr. Karn also 
highlighted a Department of Justice (DOJ) opinion concluding that 
export controls on cryptographic information "are unconstitutional in-
sofar as they establish a prior restraint on disclosure of cryptographic 
ideas and information developed by scientists and mathematicians in 
the private sector."363 
Mr. Karn's efforts were to no avail. Martha C. Harris, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Export Controls, responded that the diskette did 
not qualify for the ITAR "public domain" exemption because that ex-
emption applied only to "technical data" and cryptographic software 
does not come within the meaning of technical data as defined by the 
358. /d. 
359. Letter to Dr. Martha C. Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary For Export Controls, Depart-
ment of State, from Philip R. Kam, Jr. (June 7, 1994) [hereinafter First Appeal], available on the 
Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam_Schneier_export/ftoppy_appeal (on file 
with author). 
360. /d. 
361. /d. 
362. Most notably, Kam cited Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988), which 
affirmed a district court decision striking down certain regulations of the United States Informa· 
tion Agency as unconstitutional. More importantly, Bullfrog Films expressly rejected "the sug· 
gestion that the First Amendment's protection is lessened when the expression is directed 
abroad." !d. at 511·12. 
363. See First Appeal, supra note 359 (citing Memorandum from J. Harmon, Department of 
Justice to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President (May 11, 1978)). 
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ITAR.364 Harris also said, without explanation, that the source code 
was "of such a strategic level as to warrant continued State Depart-
ment licensing" and that continued control was "consistent with the 
protections of the First Amendment. "365 The book was never 
mentioned. 
Mr. Karn filed a second administrative appeal on Dec. 5, 1994, this 
time formally signed by counsel,366 who found the "decisions thus far 
... not only irrational as a matter of policy, but ... vulnerable to 
judicial invalidation with serious consequences for the entire export 
control regime."367 The appeal also hinted darkly about "various un-
stated policy goals," particularly those of the National Security 
Agency, that might be dictating the results to date,368 but focused pri-
marily on constitutional arguments. Specifically referring to the Har-
mon Memorandum, the appeal argued that cryptography was due full 
First Amendment protection.369 Mr. Karn further argued that the 
government's licensing scheme as applied to "pure information" was a 
form of prior restraint and that the ITAR was inherently vague and 
overbroad.37° Finally, he argued that absent a system for prompt judi-
cial review, the ITAR scheme was facially unconstitutional.371 Funda-
mentally, the appeal hammered home one point: Given the 
widespread availability of the very same information, domestically 
and abroad, in text and in digital format, "trying to prohibit the dis-
semination of the cryptographic algorithms in digital format on the 
364. Letter from Martha C. Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls, Depart-
ment of State, to Philip R. Karn, Jr. (Oct. 7, 1994), available on the Internet at http:// 
www.qualcomm.cornlpeople/pKam/exportlharris-ruling.html (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Denial of Appeal] ("The !TAR's software definition, at section 121.8(f), specifically excludes 
cryptographic software from the software for which an exporter should apply for a technical data 
license."). 
365. /d. 
366. Letter to Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 
Department of State, from Kenneth C. Bass, III, and Thomas J. Cooper, Veneble, Baetjer, How-
ard and Civiletti (Dec. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Second Appeal], available on the Internet at http:// 
www.qualcomm.cornlpeople/pKam/export/mcnamara-appeal.html (on file with author). The let-
ter clearly indicates that Karn had been represented by counsel at least as early as June 30, 1994, 
when counsel met with Dr. Harris, her staff, and a representative of another agency to explain 
Karn's position. /d. 
367. /d. 
368. /d. 
369. /d. Counsel also pointed out that the substance of the Harmon Memorandum had been 
reaffirmed by the Office of Legal Counsel on two subsequent occasions: First, in a memoran-
dum from Assistant Attorney General T. Olson to William B. Robinson (July 1, 1981), and 
second, in a memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney General L. Simms for Davis R. 
Robinson (July 5, 1984). /d. 
370. /d. 
371. /d. 
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Diskette ... reflects the pursuit of an irrational goal that bears no 
relationship to the real world."372 
The appeal closed on a pessimistic note, pointing out that the De-
partment had refused to waive any arguments based on "failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies" in the event Karn sought judicial re-
lief.373 A subsequent meeting on February 28, 1995, also proved fruit-
less, and on April 28, 1995, Philip Karn's attorneys again wrote to the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, claiming "a pattern of procrastina-
tion by federal agencies which appears to be based on the publicly 
stated policy of the National Security Agency to attempt to deter the 
further spread of strong cryptography as much as they can."374 The 
letter warned that Mr. Karn would seek judicial review not later than 
June 15, 1995, unless he received a favorable decision before that 
time.37s 
The futility of prohibiting the export of Schneier's diskette is self-
evident and amply discussed in Karn's appeals. But, barring some 
legal fiction that utterly distinguishes cryptography from speech, or 
unprecedented deference to foreign policy, the elements of prior re-
straint inherent in the ITAR licensing scheme are equally self-evident. 
Should this case actually come to trial, Mr. Karn likely will have no 
difficulty proving that the ITAR is unconstitutional as applied to his 
case, if not to cryptography in general. 
Recognition of the futility principle advocated in this Article might 
have encouraged the State Department to grant Karn's requests for 
export clearance in the first place, obviating the need for legal process 
at all. It is probable that some State Department officials advocated 
372. ld. 
373. !d. 
374. Letter to Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Af-
fairs, Department of State, from Kenneth C. Bass, III, and Thomas J. Cooper (April 28, 1995), 
available on the Internet at http://www.qualcomm.cornlpeople/pKarnlexportlmcnamara-let-
ter.html (on file with author). 
375. /d. In fact, Kam filed a complaint on September 21, 1995, in U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia (Kam v. U.S. Dept. of State, Case No. 1:95CV01812). The law suit seeks a 
judgment declaring that the relevant provisions of ITAR, as applied to Kam, are unconstitu-
tional under the First and Fifth Amendments, and that subjecting the diskette to export licensing 
controls was "irrational, arbitrary, and capricious," thus violating his Fifth Amendment right to 
substantive due process. Plaintiff's Complaint at lj[ 31, Kam v. U.S. Dept. of State, Case No. 
1:95CV01812. Mr. Kam also said that the licensing requirement was a "prior restraint on Plain-
tiff's disclosure of ideas and information," and thus contrary to his First Amendment right to 
free speech. !d. at lj[ 33. Finally, Kam said the regulations, as applied here, were unconstitution-
ally overbroad and vague, "chilling the exercise of free speech rights." !d. at 'II 34. Absent an 
adequate remedy at law for the "unusual hardship and irreparable damage" caused him, Mr. 
Kam said that he was entitled to declaratory relief. !d. at 'II 28. 
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that course of action in any event,376 and an acknowledged futility 
principle might have strengthened their hand. Even after Mr. Karn 
sought judicial relief, an early out-of-court settlement might have 
been facilitated by the application of a recognized futility principle by 
the judge in a pre-trial conference. Alternatively, the futility principle 
would have given tl;le court a basis for deciding the issue without the 
"serious consequences for the entire export control regime" that Mr. 
Karn 's attorneys predicted in the second appeal.377 Those issues 
would seem to be better reviewed in a case like Daniel Bernstein's, 
where the broader issues seem more squarely presented and there is 
no publicly available book to muddle the question before the court.378 
In the long run, the image of the judicial process as fair and rational 
is more important than governmental and judicial economy. An es-
tablished futility principle would engender such an image. The paral-
lel of Karn's case to the Spycatcher case is striking, and the remarks of 
Lord Griffiths that began this Article seem perfectly appropriate 
here.379 The law is not an "ass," and it will ultimately strike down 
restrictions imposed on Mr. Karn's export of the cryptographic dis-
kette. And, acknowledged or not, it will do so because of the futility 
principle. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has tried to show that our First Amendment jurispru-
dence contains an unacknowledged presumption against suppressing 
information that has already been made public through other media 
or to other audiences. It suggested that this presumption, designated 
"the futility principle," may be overcome only by an important gov-
ernmental interest, unrelated to the content of the speech, which can 
be directly advanced by governmental suppression. 
Moreover, this Article has argued that recognizing the futility prin-
ciple will serve the interests of governmental and judicial economy, as 
376. For example, in denying Karn's first appeal, Martha Harris candidly wrote: 
Please be assured that I reviewed your appeal with great care. The review process 
engaged attorneys, technical experts, and others both within the State Department and 
at various other government agencies. I personally spent a significant amount of time 
wrestling with the important and difficult issues raised by your request. Indeed, as I 
indicated to you in my letter of September 20, it was necessary to extend the normal 
period for consideration of such an appeal in order to ensure that the various legal and 
policy issues raised by your appeal were satisfactorily addressed. 
Denial of Appeal, supra note 364. 
377. Second Appeal, supra note 366. 
378. For the context of Daniel Bernstein's case see supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
379. See supra note 1 (discussing the irrationality of denying British citizens information that 
is readily available throughout the rest of the world). 
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well as protect the integrity of the information itself through a multi-
plicity and diversity of voices in the marketplace of ideas, and engen-
der respect for the courts and legal process. Those values and others 
have been affirmed by applying the principle to three very real cases 
that seriously threaten the viability of computer-assisted communica-
tions technology. 
In short, the futility principle exists, it matters, and it works. All 
that remains is acknowledgment by the courts- a constitutional reaf-
firmation that, even today, neither law nor equity may do a vain or 
useless thing. 
